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EDITOR’S NOTE

I

n this issue, we present three articles squarely focused on what judges do,
addressing issues of emotion, wisdom, and ethics.
In our first article, Sharyn Roach Anleu, David Rottman, and Kathy Mack

consider the role of emotion in the work judges do. They have embarked on
a four-year international study of judging and emotions; this article provides
a first look at background research, their project, and the intersection of emotions and judicial misbehavior as shown in several specific examples. For
another look at judging and emotion, take a look at Terry Maroney’s prior
Court Review article, The Emotionally Intelligent Judge: A New (And Realistic) Ideal, available online at http://goo.gl/SL96i0.
Our second article considers what qualities
constitute judicial wisdom. Your editors
noticed an online paper by Jeremy Blumenthal
and Daria Bakina that summarized their

A S S O C I A T I O N

2016

Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews. Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the working judges of the United States and Canada. In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case management, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work. Guidelines for the submission of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page 7 of volume
52, issue 1. Court Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or reject material submitted for publication.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for products and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Shelley Rockwell at (757) 259-1841.
Cover photo, Mary S. Watkins (maryswatkins@
mac.com). The cover photo is of the Andrew County
Courthouse in Savannah, Missouri.

empirical look at factors that might contribute
to judicial wisdom. Sadly, after we got their
agreement to adapt the article for our readers,
Professor Blumenthal died. We are pleased
that Professor Bakina made the adjustments needed to turn the online paper
into this article. Take a look at the characteristics of a wise judge found in the
tables at pages 77 and 78. Which do you think are the most important? We’d
welcome your comment in a letter to the editor for publication.
Our third article is one that you’ll want to keep handy to give to each new
judge appointed to your court. Cynthia Gray, one of the leading experts on
judicial ethics, provides an overview of what every new judge needs to consider as he or she moves to the bench. Of course, many of the topics covered
are significant to all judges—such as what community activities you can participate in and what business and financial activities you can carry out—so
the article will provide a useful review for experienced judges too. We do
hope, though, that you’ll pass it along to new judges while also telling them
about the benefits of membership in the American Judges Association, including Court Review.
Keep in mind that past issues of Court Review from 1998 to the present are
available at amjudges.org/publications. So if you want to find a PDF version
of any article to send to a colleague, you can. You’ll also find each AJA white
paper at amjudges.org/publications.—SL
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President’s Column
THANK YOU, SANTA FE! ON TO TORONTO!
John Conery

O

ur 2016 midyear in Santa Fe exceeded all expecta-

Some of our own AJA stalwarts, Judges Catherine Shaffer,

tions! The Chamber of Commerce “arranged” per-

Elizabeth Hines, Richard Kayne, and Gene Lucci, rounded out

fect weather conditions, sunny and cool. The hotel

our educational programs with their timely and insightful pre-

went out of its way to accommodate us, offering complimen-

sentations. Not to be outdone, newcomers Veronica Alicea-

tary breakfast and complimentary evening cocktails with food.

Johnson and Gayle Williams-Byers informed us old

The rooms were spacious and the service top-notch, as was the

“dinosaurs” of the “Perils and Profits of Social Media.” The

location near historic Santa Fe Plaza.

materials from our Santa Fe conference, as well as past confer-

Our educational programs were a “bang,” as Gene Lucci and

ences, can be accessed on our website.

Richard Kayne had a tutorial on gun safety fol-

I think it can be fairly said that the 2016 Santa

lowed by hands-on practice at the Santa Fe Sher-

Fe Midyear was a huge success! Thanks to all

iff’s gun range.

Everyone survived without a

who worked so hard to make it possible, and

scratch, thanks in no small part to our safety-

thanks, especially, to Shelley Rockwell and Barry

conscious instructors from the Sheriff’s office.

Forrest, who provide us such great staff support.

Senior Federal Judge James Parker was our

Thanks to all who attended.

luncheon speaker, and he regaled us with tales of

Speaking of attendance, Shelley Rockwell

early New Mexico “justice.” Judge Parker, along

recently sent out AJA’s registration information

with local celebrity guests Nancy Reynolds and

for our upcoming Toronto conference, Septem-

General Bob Kemble (retired), then led us on a

ber 25-30, 2016, at the Marriott Eaton Centre.

guided tour of the historic Santa Fe Federal Courthouse. Fed-

President-elect Russ Otter, along with education co-chairs

eral Court of Appeals Judge Paul J. Kelley, Jr., and Judge Parker

Richard Kayne and Catherine Carlson, have put together

took us behind the scenes and explained the historical signifi-

another top-notch educational program coupled with out-

cance of the magnificent murals that adorned the walls and

standing social activities for judges and their families. Judge

halls.

Otter will be the first Canadian judge to become the president

The next day, Chief Justice Charles Daniels of the New Mex-

of AJA, and we look forward to joining forces with our Cana-

ico Supreme Court then took us on a hilarious PowerPoint

dian counterparts as together we explore a “comparative

journey, explaining the history of the state justice system as he

approach to justice.” The registration brochure and conference

led into his keynote talk on “Pretrial Injustice: The Need for

registration and information forms are now available at

Reform.” Justice Daniels proposed reforms of the money bail

http://www.amjudges.org/conferences/.

system, where “individual release or detention of the accused

Please sign up soon, as we’d like to bring a strong contingent

before trial may depend more on a defendant’s financial

of U.S. judges to Toronto to welcome our Canadian colleagues

resources than on individual flight risk or danger to the com-

to membership in the AJA! Stronger ties with Canadian judges

munity.” New Mexico State Judicial Administrator Artie Pepin
joined Chief Justice Daniels and presented highlights from a

can only strengthen our organization and our core mission of
Making Better Judges®. The “Voice of the Judiciary®” will be

white paper published on this topic. He also discussed pro-

that much stronger with a strong Canadian membership!

posed reforms he included in a proposed white paper that is
expected to be released this fall.

As we like to say in the deep South, “Y’all come!” We hope
to see you in Toronto!
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THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN

When Can a Canadian Judge
Change Her or His Decision?
Wayne K. Gorman

I

neous principle. I therefore would reject this ground of
appeal.”7

t is clear that a Canadian judge can change a ruling or decision. For instance, it is well settled in Canada that a trial
judge can reconsider a verdict of guilty in a criminal trial
based upon the introduction of “fresh evidence”1 before sentence is imposed2 and that an appellate court can subsequently
decide an issue it had failed to address in its initial judgment3
or amend “an order already passed and perfected.”4
In R. v. J.A., after convicting the accused of a sexual offence,
the trial judge received a letter from the victim’s grandfather
indicating that the victim had told him that there were more
sexual incidents involved than he had described in his testimony.5 The trial judge refused to reopen the trial and vacate
his verdict or to declare a mistrial. On appeal, the Ontario
Court of Appeal noted that “a trial judge who has made a finding of guilt on disputed facts has the authority to vacate the
adjudication of guilt at any time before the imposition of sentence or other final disposition, but such authority should be
exercised only in exceptional circumstances and in the clearest of cases.”6 The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial
judge’s “reasons on the mistrial motion confirm that he appreciated and correctly applied the principles governing mistrial
applications and the Palmer criteria for the admission of fresh
evidence in the context of the whole of the evidence led at
trial.” It concluded, “His discretionary decision to dismiss the
mistrial motion is neither clearly wrong nor based on an erro-

It has been held that the doctrine of “implied jurisdiction”
or “jurisdiction by necessary implication” allows a Canadian
court to “vary one of its own orders in order to correct clerical
mistakes or errors arising from an accidental slip or omission
or in order to properly reflect the intention of the court.”8
This power has been extended in Canada to the point that
it exists even after a court’s formal order has been filed and
issued. Thus, in Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, the
Supreme Court of Canada stated:
The general rule that a final decision of a court cannot
be reopened derives from the decision of the English
Court of Appeal in Re St. Nazaire Co. (1879), 12 Ch. D.
88. The basis for it was that the power to rehear was
transferred by the Judicature Acts to the appellate division. The rule applied only after the formal judgment
had been drawn up, issued and entered, and was subject
to two exceptions:
1. where there had been a slip in drawing it up,
and,
2. where there was an error in expressing the manifest intention of the court.9

Footnotes
1. See R. v. Kowall, 108 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 1996 CarswellOnt 3091
(Can. Ont.); R. v. Hayward, 86 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 1993 CarswellOnt 1162 (Can. Ont.).
2. See R. v. Griffith, 2013 ONCA 510, 2013 CarswellOnt 10984
(Can. Ont.).
3. See R. v. Dhanaswar, 2016 ONCA 229, 2016 CarswellOnt 4357
(Can. Ont.).
4. See Director of Public Prosecutions v. GK, [2014] IECCA 35 (Ir.).
In In re L and B (Children), [2013] UKSC 8 [¶ 16], [¶ 19] (appeal
taken from Eng.), the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
indicated that it “has long been the law that a judge is entitled to
reverse his decision at any time before his order is drawn up and
perfected. . . . Thus there is jurisdiction to change one’s mind
up until the order is drawn up and perfected. Under the [Civil
Procedure Rules] (rule 40.2(2)(b)), an order is now perfected by
being sealed by the court. There is no jurisdiction to change one’s
mind thereafter unless the court has an express power to vary its
own previous order. The proper route of challenge is by appeal.
On any view, therefore, in the particular circumstances of this
case, the judge did have power to change her mind. The question
is whether she should have exercised it.”
5. 2015 ONCA 754, 2015 CarswellOnt 16819 (Can. Ont.).
6. Id. ¶ 24.
7. Id. ¶ 32. The reference to the “Palmer criteria” is a reference to R.

v. Palmer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759 (Can.). Palmer is the leading
authority in Canada on the introduction of “fresh evidence” on
appeal. The criteria set out in Palmer for the introduction of such
evidence has been adopted to determining if fresh evidence
should be introduced at trial after a guilty verdict has been
entered but before sentence has been imposed. The criteria as set
out in Palmer are: “(1) The evidence should generally not be
admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial
provided that this general principle will not be applied as strictly
in a criminal case as in civil cases. . . . (2) The evidence must be
relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially
decisive issue in the trial. (3) The evidence must be credible in the
sense that it is reasonably capable of belief. (4) It must be such
that if believed it could reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result.”
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, ¶ 22.
8. See Cunningham v. Lilles, 2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331,
¶ 19 (Can.); R. v. H. (E.), [1997] O.J. No. 1110, 1997 CarswellOnt
1262, ¶ 11 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Robichaud, 2011 NBCA 112, 2012
CarswellNB 289, ¶ 4 (Can. N.B.).
9. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848, ¶ 75 (Can.). In a recent decision from the
United Kingdom, reference was made to a court becoming functus
once the order was “sealed”; see Samara v. MBI & Partners UK
Ltd. (t/a MBI International & Partners Co.), [2016] EWHC 441
(QB) [¶ 60].
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However, it has also been held that the jurisdiction conferred by implication is a limited one that cannot be turned
into “judicial authority to requisition a statutory power withheld by the legislature.”10 As pointed out by the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Adams, a “court has a limited power to
reconsider and vary its judgment disposing of the case as long
as the court is not functus.”11 In McKenzie v. McKenzie, it was
held that a court is not functus when a variation of an order is
required to correct “an error in expressing the manifest intention of the court.”12
Finally, it has been suggested that vacating a verdict of
guilty by a trial judge “is a power which . . . should only be
exercised in exceptional circumstances where its exercise is
clearly called for.”13
In this edition’s column, I review two recent Canadian
Court of Appeal decisions that have considered the issue of
when and how a trial judge should reconsider a decision or
verdict rendered: R. v. Arens14 and R. v. O’Shea.15
R. v. ARENS

In Arens, the accused was convicted of the offences of
impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing
death.
Before trial, a voir dire was held to determine if the arrest of
the accused contravened the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Constitution Act 1982 (the Charter) and whether the
evidence obtained as a result of the alleged breaches should be
admitted or excluded. The evidence in issue consisted of the
observations by officers made after the accused was arrested
and video recordings of him taken at the police station (the
“impugned evidence”).
The Crown conceded that section 8 [unreasonable search
and seizure] and section 9 [arbitrary detention] of the Charter
had been violated. The Alberta Court of Appeal indicated that
these “concessions were made on the basis that the arresting
officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the
appellant and to make an evidentiary breath demand.”16 The
sole issue in contention was whether the “impugned evidence”
should be excluded.
The trial judge accepted the Crown’s concession and ruled
as follows:
The arresting officer, when he told Mr. Arens to get
out of the truck, did not have evidence of impairment
attributable to alcohol that was required to make the

10. See R. v. Crocker, [2012] N.J. No. 266, 2012 CarswellNfld 248,
¶ 14 (Can. Nfld.).
11. [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707, ¶ 29 (Can.).
12. 2016 BCCA 97, 2016 CarswellBC 522, ¶ 22 (Can. B.C.).
13. See R. v. Lessard, 30 C.C.C. (2d) 70, 1976 CarswellOnt 8, ¶ 12
(Can. Ont.).
14. 2016 ABCA 20, 2016 CarswellAlta 140 (Can. Alta.).
15. 2016 ONCA 53, 2016 CarswellOnt 574 (Can. Ont.).
16. Arens, 2016 ABCA 20, ¶ 8.
17. Id. ¶ 10.
18. Id. ¶ 13. The reference to “Grant analysis” is a reference to R. v.
Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (Can.), the leading decision in Canada on the test to be applied in determining whether

arrest. Thus, it was both an arbitrary detention and a violation of Mr. Arens’s rights to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.17
However, the trial judge concluded that the “impugned evidence” was admissible.
The evidence called on the voir dire was admitted in the trial
proper. The accused was subsequently convicted of both
charges. In convicting the accused, and without advising counsel in advance, the trial judge reversed his earlier voir dire ruling, holding that the Charter had not been breached:
It turns out that I was wrong on my Grant analysis of
section 24(2) of the Charter, in the alternative I find that
because there was a lawful arrest based on the evidence
of reasonable and probable grounds led during the voir
dire, there is no Charter breach to analyze.18
The accused appealed from conviction. The Alberta Court
of Appeal described the issue raised by the appeal in the following manner:
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether there
was a miscarriage of justice as a result of a lack of procedural fairness related to Charter rulings in a voir dire
subsequently reversed in the course of the trial judge’s
reasons for conviction, and adverse inferences he made
about the appellant’s failure to provide a breath sample.19
A majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal indicated that
failing “to provide an opportunity to present full submissions
is an error of law reviewable on a standard of correctness. . . .
While procedural fairness is usually associated with administrative law, it applies with full force in the criminal law context.”20
The majority noted that the trial judge had “the authority to
reverse his voir dire ruling as he was not functus officio.”21
However, the majority also held that the trial judge’s approach
“has the potential of bringing the administration of justice into
disrepute. The consequences of these four convictions are significant and scrupulous adherence to procedural fairness is
essential in such circumstances.”22
The majority concluded that the trial judge should have
given counsel notice of his reversal decision:
The trial judge should have given the appellant reasonable notice of his decision to reverse himself on the

19.
20.
21.
22.

evidence should be excluded if a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has been established by an accused person. The test involves a three-stage analysis: “(1) the seriousness
of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission may send the
message the justice system condones serious state misconduct),
(2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of
the accused (admission may send the message that individual
rights count for little), and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.” 2009 SCC 32, ¶ 71.
Arens, 2016 ABCA 20, ¶ 2.
Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id. ¶ 27.
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Charter breaches. Doing so would have provided the
appellant the opportunity to fully re-argue whether the
police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the
appellant. Given the Crown’s concessions and the voir
dire ruling, this opportunity was essential.
As noted above, the trial judge, having reversed himself on the Charter issues, said even in the absence of the
impugned evidence, there was a sufficient basis for conviction. However, the trial judge made extensive reference to the following impugned evidence in the course
of his reasons for conviction. First, he referred to Corporal Scarrott and Constable Tremblay’s testimony about
their post-arrest observations of the appellant at the
scene. Second, as regards events at the RCMP detachment, the trial judge made note of Constable Tremblay’s
testimony, the breathalyzer technician’s testimony, Constable Brown’s evidence, the video recording and the evidence of the paramedics. In other words, a significant
portion of the evidence the trial judge relied on was from
the evidence that followed arrest. Although he said that
he would have convicted on the other evidence, it is not
obvious why he then referred to, and seems to have
relied upon, much of the impugned evidence.23
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Martin held that the trial
judge’s “change of mind was of no consequence”:
He initially decided that the evidence was admissible on
the understanding that there had been breaches of the
appellant’s [section] 8 and [section] 9 rights. His ultimate
finding that there had not been a breach had no impact
on that ruling. In either scenario, the evidence was
admissible. This was not a situation where the trial judge
reversed himself on the admissibility of evidence.24
R. v. O’SHEA

In O’Shea, the accused pleaded guilty to the offence of possession of child pornography. At a pretrial conference, the presiding judge indicated “that a proposed 45 day sentence would
be ‘reasonable.’”25 At the sentence hearing, the same judge
imposed a period of one year imprisonment. The accused
appealed from the sentence imposed, seeking to have the
Court of Appeal reduce it to a period of 45 days.
The appeal was dismissed. The Ontario Court of Appeal
indicated that it could not “be suggested that the trial judge was

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. ¶¶ 28-29.
Id. ¶ 52.
2016 ONCA 53, 2016 CarswellOnt 574, ¶ 5 (Can. Ont.).
Id.
Id.
See Lymer v. Jonsson, 2016 ABCA 32, 2016 CarswellAlta 134, ¶ 3
(Can. Alta.).
29. In Hafichuk-Walkin v. BCE Inc., 2016 MBCA 32, 2016 CarswellMan 75, ¶ 39 (Can. Man.), it was noted that the “integrity of the
administration of justice requires finality in litigation. The evils
that multiplicity of proceedings give rise to are duplicative litiga-
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not entitled to impose a sentence of one year imprisonment”:
Even accepting that the appellant’s counsel’s notation
written at the first pre-trial (a pre-trial conducted by the
same judge who ultimately accepted the guilty plea and
imposed the sentence) to the effect that a proposed 45
day sentence would be ‘reasonable’, it was entirely permissible for the trial judge to change her mind once she
had seen the evidence of the volume and nature of the
child pornography possessed by the appellant.26
The Court of Appeal felt that this was reflected in the
exchange between the trial judge and defence counsel immediately after she imposed sentence:
THE COURT: Any questions [counsel]?
[Counsel]: Uhm, other than the fact, Your Honour
that there had been some judicial pre-trials with respect
to resolving the matters, I take it Your Honour was aware
of that? Is that correct?
THE COURT: I may have been aware of that, but I
haven’t viewed the videos and I haven’t seen the pictures
when the position was given. There’s a big difference
between [Mr. B.’s] case where it’s young adults, no, I’m
sorry, older teens, and what was seen on those particular
pictures, images and videos.27
CONCLUSION

It is clear that Canadian trial judges can reverse themselves.
However, it is also clear that the “rules of natural justice
require courts to provide an opportunity to be heard to those
who will be affected by a decision” and that a failure “to provide an opportunity to be heard is fatal to a decision.”28
In the context of reversing ourselves, great caution is
required. Finality plays an important role in the criminal and
civil trial process.29 As pointed out by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Chitsabesan v. Yuhendran, although “a judge is not
functus officio where the order has not been signed and entered
and therefore retains jurisdiction over a matter, the instances
in which it might be in the interests of justice to withdraw reasons of the court and rehear the case on the merits will be
‘rare.’”30
We should try to avoid appearing to be making tentative
decisions that we subsequently change. A lax approach to
finality in decision making has the potential to bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. The conflict is always
between finality and justice.31

tion, potential inconsistent results, undue costs and inconsistent
proceedings.”
30. 2016 ONCA 105, 2016 CarswellOnt 1615, ¶ 11 (Can. Ont.).
31. In In re L and B (Children), [2013] UKSC 8 [¶ 46], it was suggested that as “Peter Gibson LJ pointed out in Robinson v Fernsby
[2004] WTLR 257, para 120, judicial tergiversation is not to be
encouraged. On the other hand, it takes courage and intellectual
honesty to admit one’s mistakes. The best safeguard against having to do so is a fully and properly reasoned judgment in the first
place.”

Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular column (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely pub-

lished. His latest articles are The Impact of the Supreme Court
on Sentencing in Canada, 72 Supreme Court Law Review (Second Series) 319 (2016), and Ours Is to Reason Why: The Law
of Rendering Judgment, 62 Criminal Law Quarterly 301
(2015). Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca. For United States judges who
may want to read in full one of the Canadian decisions referred to
here, you can contact Judge Gorman and he will forward a copy to
you by email.

LETTERS
Editors, COURT REVIEW:
The article by Wechsler et al., “The Impact of Forensic vs.
Social-Science Evidence on Judicial Decisions to Grant a Writ
of Habeas Corpus” (COURT REVIEW, Vol. 51, #4) contains a
serious, fundamental problem. Starting with the title, the
authors talk throughout of “social science evidence.” That
would lead a reader quite reasonably to expect a presentation
of a contest between, on the one hand, testimony about
research on mistaken identity (e.g., by Elizabeth Loftus), and,
on the other, perhaps DNA evidence as “forensic” evidence. But
NO social science evidence is ever used in the vignettes presented
to the judges. Although, separately, judges are asked in a survey
about such evidence, their survey responses are not linked to
their vignette-based decisions about evidence. The authors’
error begins with a failure to define “social science evidence”
and in their saying (at p. 161) that evidence of false confessions
and eyewitness misidentification “fall[s] under the defined
domain of social-science evidence in line with social-psychological research . . . .” Yes, social psychologists have been the

primary investigators on issues as to false confession and eyewitness misidentification, but that doesn’t make those topics
themselves (eyewitness misidentification and false confessions,
as evidentiary matters) “social science evidence,” which
instead would be the introduction of social science studies
through citation in briefs, mention in lawyers’ argument, and
in expert witness testimony. To repeat, none of that social science evidence is presented in the study vignettes. The result is
that the article is a study only of judges’ reactions to various
kinds of problematic evidence, which it is certainly worthwhile
to study. However, because no social science evidence is present in their vignettes, the authors did not test judges’ reactions
to social science evidence.
Thus the authors’ conclusions about judges’ reactions to
social science evidence cannot stand.
Stephen L. Wasby
Professor of political science emeritus, University at Albany
Eastham, Mass.

AJA 2016 ANNUAL CONFERENCE

TORONTO, ONTARIO

Answers to Crossword
from page 91

Toronto Marriott Eaton Centre
September 25-30
$214 (Canadian) single/double
(should be under $200 US
depending on exchange rate)

For more information, go to http://amjudges.org/conferences
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The Emotional Dimension
of Judging:
Issues, Evidence, and Insights
Sharyn Roach Anleu, David Rottman & Kathy Mack

udicial emotions—their display in the courtroom, influence on judicial behavior, and ultimately, their impact on
public trust in the judiciary—are under scrutiny as neuroscientists and social scientists take a fresh look at judicial
work and conduct. Emotions and their regulation raise important issues for the exercise of judicial authority, a role in which
emotion is formally excised.1 What has been called “emotional
labor” is one of several key concepts guiding empirical
research and offering insights into how judges undertake their
work.2 Other related or overlapping concepts include implicit
bias, mindfulness, and procedural fairness. Judges have been
introduced to these concepts and associated research through
several articles published in the journal Court Review over
recent years.3 One of these articles, an American Judges Association white paper titled “Minding the Court: Enhancing the
Decision-Making Process,” highlights the degree to which
these scientific insights are interrelated in their implications
for judicial work.4 For example, consideration of these concepts and research initiatives has implications for judicial performance and the conduct of evaluations.5
This article seeks to enhance understanding of the role of
emotions in judging and how emotions interrelate with other
factors that influence judicial conduct, especially in court. It
does so by introducing a four-year program of research,
“Changing Judicial Performance: Emotions and Legitimacy”

(hereinafter “Emotions and Judging”), that is empirical in focus
and comparative in perspective. The empirical component
involves multiple sources of data in the United States and Australia that bear on the role of emotion in judicial behavior. The
comparative component takes advantage of extensive qualitative and quantitative research available on the Australian judiciary that speaks directly to the use of emotions in judging.6
Comparative research helps to refine the approach to a topic of
inquiry by raising new conceptual and research questions and,
on that basis, sharpening understanding of that topic.
This article is organized into five sections, beginning with
an explanation of why judges should be interested in research
on the role of emotions in their work. Section II offers a brief
summary of the social science study of emotions generally and
the manner in which it is being applied to judges. Section III
provides an overview of a new four-year international study of
judging and emotions. Section IV introduces the data sources
available for a comparative study and uses that information to
take an initial look at promising themes for the research. The
concluding section offers preliminary observations on ways
emotions in judging might be studied and the value of such
research.
Before proceeding, however, it is helpful to be clear on what
is meant by “emotion,” a term capable of covering a wide variety of states of mind and physical embodiment.7 At a general

Acknowledgment
We appreciate financial and other support from the Australian
Research Council (LP0210306, LP0669168, DP0665198, DP1096888,
DP150103663), Flinders University, and the National Center for State
Courts, as well as the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, the Association of Australian Magistrates, and many courts and
their judicial officers. We are grateful to several research and administrative assistants over the course of the research, and especially to
Jordan Bowman (National Center for State Courts), Colleen deLaine
(Judicial Research Project), Jordan Tutton (Judicial Research Project),
and Rae Wood (Judicial Research Project) for assistance with this article. All phases of this research involving human subjects have been
approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research
Ethics Committee.

and Emotional Labour, 32 J. L. & SOC’Y 590 (2005); JAMES PTACEK,
BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSES (1999); Jennifer Scarduzio, Managing Order Through
Deviance: The Emotional Deviance, Power, and Professional Work of
Municipal Court Judges, 25 MGMT. COMM. Q. 283 (2011).
See, e.g., Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key
Ingredient in Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4 (2007); Pamela
Casey et al., Addressing Implicit Bias in the Courts, 49 CT. REV. 64
(2012); Pamela Casey, Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Minding the
Court: Enhancing the Decision-Making Process, 49 CT. REV. 76
(2013); Terry Maroney, The Emotionally Intelligent Judge: A New
(and Realistic) Ideal, 49 CT. REV. 100 (2013).
See Casey, Burke & Leben, supra note 3.
See Jennifer Elek, David Rottman & Brian Cutler, Judicial Performance Evaluation in the States: A Re-Examination, 98 JUDICATURE 12
(2014).
See, e.g., Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack, Judicial Authority
and Emotion Work, 11 JUD. REV. 365 (2013).
Jan E. Stets, Current Emotion Research in Sociology: Advances in the
Discipline, 4 EMOTION REV. 326 (2012); JAN E. STETS & JONATHAN
H. TURNER, HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS: VOLUME II
(2014); Thomas Dixon, “Emotion”: The History of a Keyword in
Crisis, 4 EMOTION REV. 338 (2012).

J

Footnotes
1. Terry Maroney & James Gross, The Ideal of the Dispassionate
Judge: An Emotion Regulation Perspective, 6 EMOTION REV. 142
(2014); Terry Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial
Dispassion, 99 CAL. L. REV. 629 (2011).
2. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING (1983); Terry Maroney, Emotional
Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1485 (2011);
Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack, Magistrates’ Everyday Work

60 Court Review - Volume 52

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

level, “emotions can be viewed as culturally delineated types of
feelings or affects.”8 Emotions can be understood as a product
of social interactions; they are embedded in interpersonal relations and particular contexts.9 They are experienced,
expressed, or displayed and are recognized or interpreted by
others. Judicial words and actions in court can entail emotional display and project feelings.10
One list of what constitutes “emotion” includes both positive and negative states of “happiness, joy, pride, guilt, disappointment, anger, frustration and anxiety.”11 Another list,
derived from empirical research (survey data) identifies “nine
primary kinds of experienced emotions—tranquility, hope, joy,
pride, self-reproach, anger, rage, fear, distress—and varying
levels of correlation among these emotions.”12
Empathy has been widely discussed in the context of judging and has potential implications for understandings of
impartiality,13 though there is considerable debate about
whether empathy or compassion are emotions or capacities.14
Following Susan Bandes and Jeremy Blumenthal’s caution
against using terms for specific emotions “as if they have stable meanings,”15 this article does not attempt to distinguish
among the various types of emotion judges may experience,
display, or deploy.

Conventional understandings cast the judicial role as
strictly unemotional, with impersonality and dispassion central to neutrality, legal authority, and legitimacy. Emotion is
viewed as inherently irrational, disorderly, impulsive, and personal and therefore inconsistent with the legitimate exercise of
judicial authority.16 Performance of judicial authority should
evince emotionlessness.17 These understandings also exclude
and ignore the interpersonal dynamics that occur in court-

rooms. In sociological terms,
The neglect of the
the courtroom is more than a
emotional and
legal setting; it is a social situation in which information
interactive
and emotions must be mancomponents of
aged with similar strategies as
being a judge
in ordinary, everyday face-to18
face interactions.
may have
The neglect of the emoseveral potential
tional and interactive components of being a judge may consequences . . . .
have several potential consequences for how judges view and perform their work.
First, despite the ideal of a dispassionate judicial officer, the
everyday work of judging necessarily implicates emotions. They
are engrained in human behavior: “Put succinctly, emotions
and decision making go hand in hand.”19 Being a judge and
having the benefit of a legal education may restrain the influence of emotions on courtroom behavior and work performance, but only to a degree. A recent research study concludes, “Most judges try to faithfully apply the law, even when
it leads them to conclusions they dislike, but when the law is
unclear, the facts are disputed, or judges possess wide discretion their decisions can be influenced by their feelings about
litigants.”20 At the very least, judges must undertake emotion
work to regulate their emotions to present the image or outward appearance in the courtroom they believe appropriate
when presiding over cases.21 Their everyday work also requires
emotional labor to limit the influence of their feelings on their
decisions in individual cases in much the same way that
implicit bias must be countered if its influence in judicial decisions is to be reduced.
Second, judges’ failure to regulate their own emotions may lead
to a violation of the applicable codes or rules of judicial conduct.

8. Peggy A. Thoits, The Sociology of Emotions, 15 ANN. REV. SOC. 317,
318 (1989).
9. Kathryn J. Lively, Status and Emotional Expression: The Influence of
“Others” in Hierarchical Work Settings, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND
EMOTION (Jody Clay-Warner & Dawn T. Robinson eds., 2008);
Kathryn J. Lively & Emi A. Weed, Emotion Management: Sociological Insight into What, How, Why, and to What End?, 6 EMOTION REV.
202 (2014).
10. Kwai Hang Ng & Jeffrey L. Kidder, Toward a Theory of Emotive
Performance: With Lessons from How Politicians Do Anger, 28 SOC.
THEORY 193 (2010).
11. Kristina Murphy, Procedural Justice, Emotions and Resistance to
Authority, in EMOTIONS, CRIME AND JUSTICE 211, 211 (Susanne
Karstedt, Ian Loader & Heather Strang eds., 2011).
12. Kathryn J. Lively & David R. Heise, Sociological Realms of Emotional Experience, 109 AM. J. SOC. 1109, 1127 (2004).
13. See Rebecca K. Lee, Judging Judges: Empathy and the Litmus Test for
Impartiality, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 145 (2014); Susan A. Bandes,
Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO
133 (2009); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1574 (1987); Robin West, The Empathetic Turn, in PASSIONS
AND EMOTIONS: NOMOS LIII (James E. Fleming ed., 2012).
14. Bandes, supra note 13, at 136.
15. Susan Bandes & Jeremy Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN.

REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161, 164 (2012).
16. See Maroney, supra note 1.
17. See Keith Bybee, Paying Attention to What Judges Say: New Directions in the Study of Judicial Decision Making, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 69 (2012); Leslie Moran, Judging Pictures: A Case Study of Portraits of the Chief Justices, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 5
INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 295 (2009); David Thomas, Sentencing: The
Case for Reasoned Decisions, 10 CRIM. L. REV. 245 (1963).
18. Erving Goffman, The Interaction Order, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 8
(1983); see also Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack, Performing
Authority: Communicating Judicial Decisions in Lower Criminal
Courts, 51 J. SOC. 1052 (2015); PAUL ROCK, THE SOCIAL WORLD OF
AN ENGLISH CROWN COURT: WITNESSES AND PROFESSIONALS IN THE
CROWN COURT CENTRE AT WOOD GREEN (1993); DOUGLAS W.
MAYNARD, BAD NEWS, GOOD NEWS: CONVERSATIONAL ORDER IN
EVERYDAY TALK AND CLINICAL SETTINGS (2003).
19. Jennifer Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision Making, 66 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 799, 801 (2015).
20. Andrew Wistrich, Jeffrey Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings? 93
TEX. L. REV. 855, 911 (2015).
21. Maroney & Gross, supra note 1; Stina Bergman Blix & Åsa Wettergren, A Sociological Perspective on Emotions in the Judiciary, 8
EMOTION REV. 32 (2016); Scarduzio, supra note 2.

I.

THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EMOTIONS FOR
JUDGING
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Codes of judicial conduct and
criteria for judicial performance
evaluation take emotions and
their display into consideration.
Such codes and criteria are most
formally and specifically articulated in the United States. The
American Bar Association’s
Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(adopted in many states) provides rules and commentary indicating that failure or inability to control emotions puts judges
at risk of disciplinary complaints from litigants, attorneys, and
others. Indeed, “[c]harges of impatient, angry and impolite
behavior on the bench generate a large proportion of complaints filed with judicial conduct commissions.”22 The ABA’s
Model Program for Evaluating Judicial Performance also contains criteria related to the display of emotions.23 In Australia,
guidelines state that it is “desirable to display such personal
attributes as punctuality, courtesy, patience, tolerance and
good humour. . . . A judge must be firm but fair in the maintenance of decorum, and above all even-handed in the conduct
of the trial.”24
Third, a conscious and appropriate display of emotions can
play a positive role in court craft. The increased focus on the
positive side of emotion in decision making is general:
“[p]sychologists in recent years have devoted considerable
attention to the role—both positive and negative—that emotion plays in people’s thinking.”25 The positive role emotions
can play in judging is increasingly recognized as judicial officers are being asked to engage with court users in a more
human and emotionally intelligent way and to manage emo-

[T]he role of
emotion in
judging,
especially in
the courtroom,
is an emerging
field of research.

22. CYNTHIA GRAY, ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR JUDGES 4 (2009). The
American Bar Association Model Rule of Judicial Conduct 2.8
(Decorum, Demeanor, and Communication with Jurors) states:
“A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others
with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.” Comment [1]
states that “Judges can be efficient and businesslike while being
patient and deliberate.” MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.8 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2011).
23. See Elek, Rottman & Cutler, supra note 5.
24. See, e.g., THE COUNCIL OF CHIEF JUSTICES OF AUSTRALIA, GUIDE TO
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tions, both theirs and others’, especially in the courtroom.26
The explicit recognition of a place for emotions in judicial
work is especially evident in concepts such as procedural justice and therapeutic jurisprudence.27
II. HOW EMOTIONS SHAPE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR ON
THE BENCH

The empirical social science study of emotions and work
developed in the 1980s with a focus on people in jobs requiring interaction with the public. “Emotional labor” referred initially to the dissonance experienced by people in customer-service jobs. Such workers are expected to manage their emotions
in a manner that presents the public with an employer-prescribed presentation of their selves.28 Their outward display is
supposed to be unaffected by their privately felt emotions. In
the pioneering work of Arlie Hochschild, emotional labor is
defined as “the management of feeling to create a publicly
observable facial and bodily display.”29 Over time, the study of
emotional labor extended to professionals like lawyers, medical doctors, and, recently, to judges—sometimes referred to as
“privileged emotion managers.”30 Compared to service workers, “professionals interact with clients rather than customers
and have a much greater degree of autonomy.”31 For these
workers, the nature and complexity of the role of emotions is
different.
Although there is considerable research and literature on
judges, the nature of judging, judicial decision making,32 and
emotions, both experienced and expressed,33 the role of emotion in judging, especially in the courtroom, is an emerging
field of research.34 Scholarly attention to emotions in criminal
justice, especially trials and sentencing, tends not to consider
emotion in relation to the judicial role across the range of judi-

30. Wharton, supra note 28, at 152; see also SHARON C. BOLTON, EMOTION MANAGEMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (2004); Sharon C. Bolton &
Carol Boyd, Trolley Dolly or Skilled Emotion Manager? Moving on
from Hochschild’s Managed Heart, 17 WORK, EMPLOYMENT & SOC’Y
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Clients Seeking Asylum, 17 INT. J. LEGAL PROF. 153 (2010); Joy
Kadowaki, Maintaining Professionalism: Emotional Labor Among
Lawyers as Client Advisors, INT. J. LEGAL PROF. (2015); Åsa Wettergren & Stina Bergman Blix, Empathy and Objectivity in the Legal
Procedure: The Case of Swedish Prosecutors, J. SCANDINAVIAN STUD.
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIME PREVENTION (forthcoming).
31. Wharton, supra note 28, at 153.
32. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006); Bergman Blix & Wettergren, supra note 21; LEE EPSTEIN, RICHARD POSNER & WILLIAM LANDES, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013); MICHAEL KIRBY, JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM: AUTHORITY, PRINCIPLE AND POLICY IN THE JUDICIAL
METHOD (2004); Jeffrey Segal, Judicial Behavior, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 19 (Keith Wittington et al. eds., 2010).
33. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 2; Wharton, supra note 28.
34. See Bandes & Blumenthal, supra note 15; Maroney & Gross, supra
note 1; Roach Anleu & Mack, supra note 6; Mary Schuster & Amy
Propen, Degrees of Emotion: Judicial Responses to Victim Impact
Statements, 1 CULTURE & HUMANITIES 75 (2010).

cial assignments and judicial actions.35 Some legal scholars
provide important conceptual insights about judicial emotion
but often depend on the reflections of a few judicial officers
rather than substantial empirical data.36 Similarly, the considerable professional literature about judicial performance evaluation, especially in the United States, mainly describes practical aspects of evaluation and rarely incorporates explicit
attention to displays of emotion or to judges’ experiences and
perceptions.37 One exception, an observational study of courtrooms in two American municipal courts supplemented by
interviews with 12 of their judges, concludes, “it is clear that
the professional work of judges is actually quite emotional,
especially during the legal process.”38
This brief summary of existing perspectives and research sets
the stage for introducing the Emotions and Judging Project, dedicated to building a more systematic empirical foundation for
studying how judges experience, manage, and display emotions,
especially in the interactive environment of the courtoom.
III. THE EMOTIONS AND JUDGING PROJECT39

The Emotions and Judging Project is a program of research
designed to generate original empirically based knowledge
about emotion and judging by investigating how emotion
(including emotionlessness) is performed and managed. It
aims to explain under which conditions judicial emotion and
emotional expression appear and assess when and how such
emotions enhance or detract from judicial performance. It will
integrate new knowledge about judicial emotion with core
concepts of impartiality and legitimacy to build an innovative
understanding of judicial behavior, especially in relation to, or
when interacting with, others in court.
In social science terms, this comparative project addresses
the “fit” between emotion in judges’ everyday work and the
norms (explicit and implicit) regarding judicial performance
and its evaluation. Norms are expectations for behavior that
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MOUND CITY BAR (2007); Jennifer Elek & David Rottman, Improving Judicial Performance Evaluation: Countering Bias and Exploring
New Methods, 49 CT. REV. 140 (2013); Rebecca Gill, Sylvia Lazos
& Mallory Waters, Are Judicial Performance Evaluations Fair to
Women and Minorities—A Cautionary Tale from Clark County,
Nevada, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 731 (2011).
38. The study also claimed that “it seems municipal court judges use
emotion as a tool, either implicitly or explicitly, to draw attention
to the power they possess and to cue the defendants into which

can be enforced either as a rule
The Emotions and
by an authority (e.g., judicial
Judging Project
canons) or by less formal reputation-based consequences (the responds to four
latter are sometimes called
key changes in
“social norms”).40
The Emotions and Judging judicial work that
Project responds to four key heighten the role
changes in judicial work that
of emotions,
heighten the role of emotions,
positively and
positively and negatively. First,
negatively.
the norms of judicial behavior are
changing in ways that will expect
or even require certain kinds of
potentially emotionally laden conduct, or at least the appearance
of greater engagement, and to recognize the emotional and
social needs of others in the courtroom. One example is the
growth of problem-oriented courts, such as drug courts, mentalhealth courts, and community courts. These courts often draw
on therapeutic jurisprudence principles and increasingly rely on
practices based on procedural fairness.41 The link between judging and both therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural fairness
is not limited to problem-oriented courts; these ideas, along with
procedural-fairness principles and approaches, are beginning to
inform everyday judicial work in Australia and in the United
States, especially in lower courts.42
Second, another growing challenge to the conventional
understanding of judging as detached and emotionless is the
increasing proportion of litigants in the United States and in
Australia that either need to or want to represent themselves in
court. The role of the attorney is either absent or diminished in
such cases. Both developments require greater attention to emotions, different emotional capacities such as empathy, and more
emotion work, including management of the judicial officer’s
own emotions or those of others.43 Each requires some judicial

39.
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behaviors are appropriate and which are not.” Scarduzio, supra
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engagement with court participants
as people with social relationships
and personal needs rather than as
simply cases or legal categories.44
Third, there is increased attention to the qualities and skills
needed for judicial performance as
part of initial appointment, ongoing
professional development, and evaluation of individual judicial
performance. Judicial appointment within Australia is being
formalized, with explicit statements of required or expected
skills and qualities.45 Expanded professional development programs enable judicial officers to improve their performance
according to articulated expectations that sometimes expressly
address emotions.46 Judicial performance evaluation, especially
in the United States, identifies actions that conform to or depart
from models of good or acceptable judicial behavior.47 In the
ABA Model Judicial Performance Survey, relevant criteria are
found in the area of “Professionalism and Temperament” (as
well as under “Integrity and Impartiality”).48 In Australia, judicial performance is coming under broader scrutiny from governments and the public.49 This desire for scrutiny and
accountability has a long history in the United States, where
formal judicial performance evaluations take place in nearly

one-half of the states and are encouraged by leading professional organizations such as the American Bar Association.50
Fourth, the composition of the judiciary is changing, with
more women in all judicial roles. A substantial international
literature addresses the question of whether women judges will
make a difference to judging or will judge differently.51 The
conventional model of the judge may associate legitimate judicial performance with a particular kind of masculinity and its
associated emotions and feeling rules.52 Recent scholarship
suggests that, regardless of whether women themselves judge
differently, it appears that they may be evaluated differently.53
These developments are changing the definition of good
judging. They create a practical tension for judicial officers in
their everyday work and a conceptual tension for those seeking to understand judging. Judicial behavior that effectively
incorporates human personality and feeling may enhance public confidence in the courts and the judiciary.54 However, some
human, emotionally laden judicial behavior could indicate that
the judicial officer is not sufficiently detached and so raise
questions about the impartiality and legitimacy of judicial
authority.55 The Emotions and Judging Project addresses these
tensions by examining the ways judicial officers experience
and display emotion and assesses the implications for legitimate judicial performance and its evaluation.
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Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 L. & SOC’Y REV. 51
(1984); Tom Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV.
103 (1988); THE COUNCIL OF CHIEF JUSTICES OF AUSTRALIA, GUIDE
TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007); Gleeson, supra note 24.
See Gleeson, supra note 24; COUNCIL OF CHIEF JUSTICES OF
AUSTRALIA, supra note 54.
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Four primary research questions drive the direction and
methods of the Project’s response to these important trends.
They are:
1. What are the formal rules and informal norms that
govern emotions in the performance of the judicial
role?
2. What kinds of emotions, emotional expression, and
emotion-related judicial behavior, including emotion-management strategies, actually occur in court
proceedings?
3. How do judicial officers experience and understand
the role of emotions in their work?
4. How can judging and judicial performance be conceptualized to take account of the place of emotion in
the everyday work of judicial officers?
Next is a description of the relevant data available in Australia and in the United States and a preliminary assessment of
what that data can reveal in relation to the four questions. The
different types, quality, and quantity of data available from
each country will be a critical element in the comparative
aspect of the Emotions and Judging Project.

everyday work, and the ways
matters are handled in court.57
Taken together, these varied
data sources provide extensive
information on judicial emotional experiences and on the
ways emotion appears in the
interactive dimensions of the
courtroom.58 In particular, the
Judicial Research Project’s
National Court Observation
Study has collected data on
several aspects of the interactive dimensions of the courtroom, especially judicial
demeanor.59

The Emotions and
Judging Project
addresses these
tensions by
examining the
ways judicial
officers experience
and display
emotion and
assesses the
implications for
legitimate judicial
performance and
its evaluation.

A. AUSTRALIAN DATA
Since 2000, the Magistrates Research Project and the Judicial
Research Project of Flinders University, led by Sharyn Roach
Anleu and Kathy Mack, have undertaken extensive empirical
research into many aspects of the Australian judiciary on a
national basis.56 The projects have used interviews, surveys,
and observation studies to investigate the attitudes of magistrates and judges toward their work, their experiences of their

B. UNITED STATES DATA
The
last
large-scale
national study of United
States judges was conducted in the late 1970s.60 More recently,
evaluations of problem-solving courts have involved observations and surveys of judges and participants. There is no equivalent to the Judicial Research Project’s rich data archive of
social science research on which to build an analysis that can
meaningfully address the research questions. Instead, the starting point for the United States is two sources of publicly available information that can be used to identify the role emotion
plays in disciplinary actions.61
The archive of the Center for Judicial Ethics is the only
national source of information on such disciplinary actions.62

56. In Australia’s system of government, federal courts operate at the
national level, and separate court systems exist for each of the six
states and two territories. All states and territories have a supreme
court as well as a magistrates or local court. Magistrates courts adjudicate less serious criminal charges and lower-value civil cases,
including small claims, and hear the first stages of all criminal cases.
Australian magistrates are paid judicial officers with legal qualifications and are appointed until a fixed retirement age. Sharyn Roach
Anleu & Kathy Mack, The Professionalism of Australian Magistrates:
Autonomy, Credentials, and Prestige, 44 J. SOC. 185 (2008). They sit
alone without juries in metropolitan, regional, and remote areas;
those who appear in these courts are often unrepresented. Over 90%
of all civil and criminal cases are initiated and finalized in the lower
courts. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, Court
Administration, in REPORT ON GOVERNMENT SERVICES (2016); Kathy
Mack & Sharyn Roach Anleu, ‘Getting Through the List’: Judgecraft
and Legitimacy in the Lower Courts, 16 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 341
(2007). There are approximately 160 judicial officers in Commonwealth courts, 400 state and territory judges, and 450 state and territory magistrates totaling over 1,000 judicial officers, organized into
over 25 different courts. In this article, the term “magistrate” refers
to members of the Australian judiciary who preside in the first
instance or lower state and territory courts, and “judge” indicates
those who preside in the higher (intermediate and supreme) state
and territory courts or national courts. The terms “judiciary” and
“judicial officer” are used more generally. For more information, see
http://www.flinders.edu.au/law/judicialresearch.
57. See Sharyn Roach Anleu et al., Researching Emotion in Courts and

the Judiciary: A Tale of Two Projects, 7 EMOTION REV. 145 (2015).
58. Mack & Roach Anleu, supra note 54; Roach Anleu & Mack, supra
note 6.
59. Mack & Roach Anleu, supra note 54; Mack & Roach Anleu, supra
note 56.
60. JOHN PAUL RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK STYLE
AND PERFORMANCE (1980).
61. States differ in the point at which a judicial-discipline proceeding
becomes public knowledge and whether the fact-finding hearing
is public. In 35 states, the fact-finding hearing is held in public.
Of those states, in 28 the hearing becomes public when formal
charges are filed, in 5 when answers to formal charges are filed,
and in 2 when the public hearing is announced. In the remaining
15 states (and D.C.) where the fact-finding hearing is confidential, in 13 confidentiality is maintained until recommendations
for public discipline are filed, and in 3 confidentiality only ends
when the court orders public discipline. National Center for State
Courts, When Confidentiality Ceases in Judicial Discipline Proceedings, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/
~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/
When-confidentiality-ceases.ashx.
62. The Center for Judicial Ethics’ Judicial Conduct Reporter quarterly
“summarizes recent decisions and advisory opinions, reports
developments in judicial discipline, and includes articles on judicial ethics and discipline procedure topics. The winter issue (the
first one in the year) reviews the previous year.” On its blog, the
Center provides an update each Tuesday of all newly issued public admonishments, reprimands, and removals.
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The Center’s director, Cynthia
Gray, kindly provided the
authors with descriptions of 78
disciplinary cases in the Center’s
archive of disciplinary actions
during the years 2011 to 2014.
These included examples of
“improper judicial demeanor by
a judge on the bench” as well as
incidents that relate to “abuse of
contempt power,” which can be
seen as expressions of anger.63
The Project team will supplement this national source by
accessing the online detailed public records of the Arizona
Commission on Judicial Conduct. Arizona appears to maintain
the most comprehensive publicly available descriptions of the
specific events underlying the behavior that led to a public
finding of misconduct. These public records allow us to place
disciplinary actions based on judicial emotions into a wider
context of discipline based on other behaviors.64
Disciplinary action against Australian judges and magistrates
is initiated through misconduct proceedings and generally
becomes public knowledge only when it results in an attempt
to remove the judicial officer from office. This usually requires
a resolution of both houses of the parliament.65 New South
Wales and the Australian Capital Territory are the only jurisdictions with a formal misconduct process that provides public
information on serious disciplinary complaints and their outcomes.66 However, such proceedings are very rare. In other
states and territories, misconduct complaints are dealt with
informally and do not enter the public record. The specific
nature of misconduct proceedings and the criteria defining misconduct vary by the state or territory in which a complaint is
filed and by the level of court on which a judge serves.67
This article looks at some examples of disciplinary actions
drawn from the United States’ Center for Judicial Ethics’
national archive as a way to identify themes that might answer
some of the Project’s research questions. The examples of disciplinary actions based on emotions relate to the situation in the
United States, taking advantage of what can be learned from
emotional displays or reactions that led to a complaint being
filed with a disciplinary body and ultimately made public. Such
archives of public actions provide excellent sources of data for
researchers concerned with judicial work as well as with showing how a state judiciary can demonstrate its accountability to
the public. For the Emotions and Judging Project, the archives
make it possible to conduct comparative research on emotions
in judging in both Australia and the United States.

IV. WHAT DOES JUDICIAL MISBEHAVIOR BASED ON
EMOTIONS LOOK LIKE?

63. E-mail from Cynthia Gray, Director, Center for Judicial Ethics, to
the authors (May 29, 2015) (on file with the authors).
64. Rebecca Berch & Erin Bass, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: A Critical Assessment, 4 OÑATI SOC.-LEG. SERIES 927 (2014).
65. Roach Anleu, Mack & Tutton, supra note 49, at 631; Kathy Mack
& Sharyn Roach Anleu, The Security of Tenure of Australian Magistrates, 30 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 370 (2006).
66. Roach Anleu, Mack & Tutton, supra note 49.

67. Id. at 629-38.
68. GRAY, supra note 22, at 4.
69. For an earlier effort of this kind that is focused on “judicial rudeness,” see Maxine Goodman, Three Likely Causes of Judicial Misbehavior and How These Causes Should Inform Judicial Discipline,
41 CAP. U. L. REV. 949 (2013).
70. In re Watkins, No. 12-1008 (W. Va. Mar. 26, 2013), available at
www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/docs/spring2013/12-1008.pdf.
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This section provides an overview of what can be learned
from the two data sources available to study emotions and
judging in the United States, starting with the national archive
and then looking at the information available from Arizona.
A. CENTER FOR JUDICIAL CONDUCT ARCHIVES
Under the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, ways in
which judges can behave intemperately leading to disciplinary
action include “rude and abusive behavior, biased comments,
misuse of the contempt power, and treatment of court staff,
including sexual harassment.”68 Here, the focus is on three
excerpts from public disciplinary actions as a first look at judicial misconduct related to emotions and a sense of the kinds of
issues likely to be important to the Emotions and Judging Project.69 These examples are chosen to illustrate research themes
rather than to provide a comprehensive or representative
overview of the range of cases that entail emotion display and
judicial misconduct. Each example is followed by comments
on the issues raised about the study of emotions and judging.
1. Anger Acknowledged But Continued 70
The first example comes from West Virginia in 2012 and
relates to divorce proceedings. The judge began with the following interchange with Complainant 1:
Judge:
Before we get started . . . , if you say
one word out of turn you’re going to
jail . . . do you understand me? Yes or
no?
Complainant 1: Yes.
Judge:
After we closed here you went out
there talked to a reporter . . . five seconds after you left here. . . . This
morning I now see an article from
your little buddy Smith with a picture
of my home . . . my home on the front
page.
Complainant 1: [inaudible]
Judge:
SHUT UP! [sound distortion] Did I
tell you to speak? My wife is disabled,
she is there alone . . . and you, you disgusting piece of . . . you put our picture of my house . . . because of you
. . . my house has been vandalized four
times[.] [Y]ou realize that of course
because I’m sure you’re probably in on
it laughing about it. I swear to you.
You’re responsible. You are responsi-

ble. I am holding you personally
responsible for anything that happens
at my house. . . . It’s disgraceful that
you and your little buddies do not
have the guts, the integrity, just the
human decency, but no you gotta
threaten my family now, well buddy,
[it’s] personal . . . it is personal. You
have threatened my family and I
promise you you will not hear the end
of it from me. In fact. I’m going to
recuse . . . I tell you I’m too angry to
even be appropriate in this case.
Moments afterward, the judge apologized to Complainant
1’s ex-wife and her counsel and decided not to recuse himself
from the case. The judge continued the hearing, later accusing
Complainant 1 of telling “a damn lie and you know it’s a damn
lie.” Several times when Complainant 1 attempted to speak,
the judge cut him off and told him to “shut up.”71
In this interaction, the judge allowed personal feelings to
influence his courtroom conduct, including starting the proceedings with an explicit threat to incarcerate one of the parties. The judge commenced hearing the matter with a display
of anger and a threat.72 This display of emotion was reactive.
The complainant had talked with a reporter, and, as a result, a
photo of the judge’s house appeared in the newspaper. The
judge linked this behavior with the subsequent vandalization
of his house and fear for the safety of his wife, resulting in the
display of anger in the courtroom. In the transcript, the judge
acknowledges that he is angry and unable to be impartial but
decides to continue hearing the case, despite the earlier claim
that he would recuse himself, and almost immediately resumes
his inappropriate conduct toward one of the parties.
The Judicial Hearing Board considered this incident among
other complaints about the judge’s behavior. The judge was
found to have violated the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia accepted
the Board’s recommended sanction: censuring the judge for 24
violations and suspending him without pay until the end of his
judicial term (another four years).
2. Antagonism Toward a Courtroom Participant73
The second excerpt, from New Jersey in 2011, involved the
filing of cross-complaints for restraining orders from Ms. P and
Mr. P. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee
on Judicial Conduct summarizes:
[A]fter [the judge] granted Ms. P.’s request for an adjournment to provide her the opportunity to obtain counsel,
Mr. P. brought up the fact that he had not seen the couple’s
four-year[-]old child for approximately one week. . . .
After asking Mr. P. several questions about his living
arrangements, [the judge] asked Ms. P., “Why shouldn’t
[Mr. P.] see his daughter?” . . . [The judge] thereafter insti-

71. Id. at 17-19.
72. See Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (2012).
73. In re Baker, No. ACJC 2010-151 (N.J., May 2, 2011) (Present-

tuted a temporary visitation
In this interaction,
schedule for Mr. P., which was
the judge
set to expire on January 7,
2010, the day of the parties’ allowed personal
next court date. . . .
feelings to
When Ms. P. indicated that
influence his
her daughter was “not used
to being with her father” for
courtroom
the length of time scheduled, conduct, including
[the judge] asked Ms. P. why
starting the
she would have a problem
allowing her daughter to proceedings with
spend time with her father an explicit threat
when she had “no problem
to incarcerate one
sending [her] daughter to a
of the parties.
preschool where the first day
she went, she was with total
strangers.” . . . The dialogue between [the judge] and Ms.
P. continued as follows:
Ms. P.: You don’t need to yell at me, please.
Judge: Ma’am, don’t talk. You’ve got a problem with
your daughter seeing her father?
Ms. P.: Yes, I do, yes, I do, Your Honor, yes, I do.
Judge: Well, ma’am, let me tell you something.
Ms. P.: I do.
Judge: You need some serious help.
Ms. P.: Okay.
Judge: Because you have no clue what it is to be a
parent.
Ms. P.: Okay. He has a severe mental illness.
Judge: Ma’am, keep your mouth quiet. When I talk,
you listen. Don’t you dare talk back to me. I
don’t know who you think you’re talking to,
but you do not dare talk back to me. You
understand that?
Ms. P.: Yes.
Judge: Then obey it. I’m not some friend of yours
out on the street. I’m a Superior Court judge
that demands the respect of my position, and
you will give it to me. And you will not convince me that it’s okay for your daughter to
go spend time with strangers, but can’t with
her own father, because you know what you
forgot? Let me remind you. There’s only one
reason why he’s her father, that’s the decision
you made.
Ms. P.: And it was a bad one.
Judge: Ma’am—so, what does that tell me about your
judgment? If you made a bad decision choosing him as a father, why should I believe anything about your judgment today? Well, you
just admitted, you’ve got bad judgment.
Ms. P.: I made a mistake. We all make mistakes, I’m
human.

ment), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/ACJC
%20Presentment%20Max%20A%20Baker.pdf.
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The judge clearly Judge: And you’re making
a huge mistake
took sides in the
when you tell me
today that you don’t
custody dispute
think your daughter
largely based on
deserves to be with
his own belief
her father.
about best
practices . . . and Subsequently:
Judge: Ma’am, don’t talk
berated the party
back to me. Who do
with whom he
you think you are?
Any parent that
disagreed.

Ms. P.:
Judge:

Ms. P.:
Judge:

Ms. P.:
Judge:

Ms. P.:
Judge:
Ms. P.:
Judge:
Ms. P.:
Judge:

takes steps to limit
the other parent’s
time with the child
doesn’t qualify to be a parent. You want to do
what’s good for your daughter, encourage her to
go spend time with her father. That’s her father.
Not a stranger. He has equal rights, as you. You
don’t get any preference because you’re her
mother. And if you made a mistake, too bad.
We’re not going to punish your daughter today
because of your poor judgment, and I’m not
going to allow your poor judgment to continue.
You understand that?
Um hum.
When you come back on the 7th, you’d better
hope that we don’t hear there’s been a problem
with these three short periods of time, because
if it was up to me, I was going to allow him to
have your daughter from now until next
Wednesday.
She wouldn’t go.
Oh, yes, she would. Oh, yes, she would. Because
you don’t understand, when I order it, it happens. It’s not a request of you, it’s an order. You
know what happens if you disobey a court
order? Ma’am, do you know what happens?
Yes, I understand what happens.
You’ll be sitting over there with this guy right
here [referring to a shackled prisoner sitting in
the courtroom]. This is not a request. I am
telling you, it will happen.
Okay, Your Honor.
And I am telling you—
Okay.
—there will be consequences if you interfere
with it. We understand each other?
Yes.
All right. . . . Sir, enjoy your time with your
daughter.74

74. Id. at 4-7.
75. In re Baker, No. ACJC 2010-151 (N.J., May 2, 2011) (Order),
available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/D-9510%20Baker%20Reprimand%20ACJC.pdf.
76. In re Jones, No. JC-10-069-C (N.H. Jud. Conduct Committee, July
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The New Jersey Supreme Court reprimanded the judge for
making extreme and excessive remarks, in a loud, hostile,
angry, and antagonistic manner, to a mother after she questioned a visitation schedule.75
The judge clearly took sides in the custody dispute largely
based on his own belief about best practices in child rearing
and berated the party with whom he disagreed. The disciplinary committee relied heavily on the tone and volume of voice
exhibited by the judge, noting that “the audio recording of the
. . . proceeding was instrumental” in its decision to discipline
the judge. Unlike the case above, the emotion display here
does not seem to have been triggered by the actions of the
applicant. The judge’s decision is cast as a series of threats. If
the daughter and mother do not comply with the court order,
the judge indicates: “You’ll be sitting over there with this guy
[a shackled prisoner].” This threatening language is perhaps
used to invoke the emotion of fear on the part of the mother.
3. Judicial Overreach76
In the next example, the judge’s statements and interchange
with the prosecutor display anger and frustration. The judge
went so far as to threaten contempt proceedings, thus silencing the prosecutor. The police chief filed a grievance, and the
State of New Hampshire Judicial Conduct Committee
describes the complaint:
[I]n the context of a criminal matter . . . wherein the
defendant appeared pro se for a trial on a Class B misdemeanor, [the judge] informally inquired of the defendant as to whether he had any evidence showing that his
driver[’]s license was not suspended. Following colloquy in open court between the Court and the defendant,
[the judge] asked the defendant whether he would like
to hear any more evidence. When the police prosecutor
. . . objected reminding the Court that [the State] had
not proffered any evidence, . . . [the judge] informed the
prosecutor that the State had indirectly put forward its
evidence. When the prosecutor continued to request
that the Court move forward with trial of this matter,
[the judge] responded . . . , “Be quiet. Be quiet. OK? Hey.
When you sit up here you can decide. All right? Be
quiet. Listen, one more time, be quiet. One more time,
and I’m going to have these folks take you out of here,
OK? There is a certain protocol—certain protocol you
have? Certain protocol that I have. And you are stepping
over the line. Don’t step over the line.” When the prosecutor further attempted to address the Court, [the
judge] responded: “One more time, one more time, one
more time and you’re out of here. You decide. You
decide.” Under the threat of an apparent contempt finding, the prosecutor said nothing further.77
In this example, the judge’s responses seems disproportion-

9, 2011) (Reprimand), available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/
c o m m it t e e s /judc o nduc t c o m m /do c s /A DMNRepri mandJudgeMichaelJones.pdf.
77. Id.

ate to the prosecutor’s reminder that the State “had not proffered any evidence” and request to continue with the trial. The
judge’s comments suggest his anger was caused by the prosecutor’s intervention before the defendant could answer, which
he perceived as disrupting court hierarchy, thereby questioning
judicial status. The judge’s anger is framed as reinforcing judicial authority: “When you sit up here you can decide.” The
judge is delineating the professional boundaries between the
judiciary and the prosecution. By closing his demands with the
questions “OK?” and “All right?” and the threat of contempt
proceedings, the judge obtains the prosecutor’s compliance
and further demonstrates to the defendant (and others in the
courtroom) that the judge controls the proceedings and the
participation of other participants.
The New Hampshire Judicial Conduct Committee found
that the judge had violated several Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and ultimately issued a reprimand. It also determined that “no . . . violations will recur by virtue of [the
judge’s] retirement” and that “the violations [were] not of a
sufficiently serious nature to warrant the imposition of formal
discipline by the court.”78
B. A FOCUS ON ARIZONA
The examples above are derived from the Judicial Conduct
Center’s database that seeks to include all public sanctions
against a judge. The cases in that national database reflect a
variety of state codes of judicial conduct and disciplinary systems.79 For consistency in such arrangements, a focus on a single state seemed the best source for preliminary analysis. Examination of the judicial conduct commissions and their actions
led to selecting Arizona for a closer look at the role of emotions
in provoking public disciplinary actions. One advantage is that
the Project can draw on all disciplinary actions over a specific
time period and select the ones meeting criteria for discipline
based on emotional displays. The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct, via its webpage, provides information on the
numbers of complaints per year and their outcomes: dismissal
of the complaint or sanction of the judicial officer, such as reprimand, censure, suspension, or removal. In cases involving a
sanction, the Commission typically provides a copy of the complaint, a response to the notice of complaint prepared by the
judge or the judge’s lawyer, which is often detailed, and its
order outlining the ways the behavior and demeanor of the
judge contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus, while
formal sanctions are rare,80 these cases provide rich and detailed
information on judicial performance and emotion display.
Both the Center for Judicial Ethics and the Arizona data represent only the tip of the iceberg of judicial discipline and an
even smaller subset of judicial behavior generally.81 While that

78. Id. at 7.
79. See Cynthia Gray, How Judicial Conduct Commissions Work, 28
JUST. SYS. J. 405, 407, 417 (2007).
80. See id. at 417.
81. To put these numbers in context, public disciplinary actions are
rare. In 2015, for example, only 27 states issued any such actions;
the annual national total was 115 public disciplinary actions,
compared to a total of 122 actions in the preceding year. State
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ject’s research questions.
The disciplinary cases can being challenged
help clarify the scope and extent
by the changing
of the formal and informal
norms that govern emotion and nature of judicial
work and by
judicial behavior. This is an
example of studying “extreme
the greater
cases,” which has both advanunderstanding of
tages and limitations.82 One
the positive role
highly influential statement on
the value of extreme cases
emotions can
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[A]typical or extreme cases
often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic
mechanisms in the situation studied. In addition, from
both an understanding-oriented and an action-oriented
perspective, it is often more important to clarify deeper
causes behind a given problem and its consequences
than to describe the symptoms of the problem and how
frequently they occur.83
On that basis, the data sources available to us in the United
States can offer a tentative window into the role of emotions in
judicial behavior at the extreme.
V. CONCLUSION

Historically, judging has been presented as unemotional,
emphasizing legal rules and reason to the exclusion of feeling
and emotion. That is not currently, if it ever was, a valid
description of how judges make decisions and behave in the
courtroom. Emotion is inherent in all human behavior and is
embedded in social interaction, including in the courtroom.84
The actual desirability of viewing the judicial role as unemotional is being challenged by the changing nature of judicial
work and by the greater understanding of the positive role
emotions can have in generating better case outcomes and
improved public trust at a time in which it is increasingly
required.
This article offers a first look at the goals and current direction of the Emotions and Judging Project. One important direction is to learn from public records of judicial disciplinary
actions in the United States. Over the life of the Project, the
ability to make comparative statements about Australia and the

Judicial Discipline in 2015, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Spring 2016, at 1;
State Judicial Discipline in 2014, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Winter 2015,
at 1. (Data on file with authors.)
82. See Bent Flyvbjerg, Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study
Analysis, 12 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 219 (2006).
83. Id. at 229.
84. Sharyn Roach Anleu et al., Observing Judicial Work and Emotions:
Using Two Researchers, QUALITATIVE RES. (forthcoming).
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United States will grow as more
data are collected.
Some observations can be made
on the role of emotions in judging
and on ways the study of emotions
relates to current work on procedural fairness and the challenge of
conducting meaningful assessments of judicial performance.
First, the value of research
focusing on the emotional component of judging is evident. The role
of emotion can be seen positively
as intrinsic to adapting to some of the major changes now taking place in judging. Enhancing the ability of judges to regulate their emotions can assist in managing difficult court situations, such as with self-represented litigants and during the
presentation of victim-impact statements.85 Judicial emotional
display can be a positive factor in achieving desired outcomes
such as reduction in recidivism and increased compliance with
court orders, especially in problem-oriented courts. On the
other hand, it is clear that inappropriate emotional display is
an important factor in some of the most serious disciplinary
actions taken in the United States—and perhaps in less serious
complaints as well.
Second, the potential for insights from studying “extreme
cases” such as public disciplinary actions seems clear. The
work of states like Arizona and the Center for Judicial Conduct, in generating and collating public records of state
actions, provides important statements of judicial accountability and enables valuable empirical research on the role of emotion in judicial behavior. Anger and other emotions appear to
cause some judges to step out of a proper judicial role and
engage in retribution against or mistreatment of individuals
present in the courtroom. This is not confined to persons who
are directly before the court; those in the public gallery can be
the target of judicial misbehavior. Even recognizing and
acknowledging an inability to regulate emotions in a particular
case does not necessarily prevent a continuation of the
improper behavior on the part of the judge. Emotions can be
the basis of or the means to make evident a judge’s partiality
toward one of the parties to a case.
Third, in both the United States and in Australia, judges
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85. Tracey Booth, ‘Cooling Out’ Victims of Crime: Managing Victim Participation in the Sentencing Process in a Superior Sentencing Court,
45 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 214 (2012); Susan A. Bandes,
Remorse and Criminal Justice, 8 EMOTION REV. 14 (2016).
86. For example, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct states in
Rule 2.8(B) that “[a] judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.” Judges are largely left to establish their own criteria for what
is dignified and what is courteous. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT,
r. 2.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); see also COUNCIL OF CHIEF JUSTICES OF
AUSTRALIA, supra note 54.
87. In the United States, the Judicial Conduct and Ethics series provides updates of disciplinary decisions relevant to specific canons.
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appear to have few or no clear statements as to what constitutes appropriate demeanor and emotional display. Rules of
conduct tend to be worded in generalities even when commentaries are presented.86 An important goal of issuing public
disciplinary actions is to provide judges with specific guidance
through examples of what constitutes behavior prohibited by
the official rules of conduct.87 Systematic study of these
“extreme cases” can help provide such guidance. However,
these sources are limited in their ability to provide guidance on
positive emotional expression or experience.
Fourth, another potential source of specificity available to
judges in some states are elements of judicial performance
evaluation processes. Questions asked in judicial performance evaluation surveys or express criteria used in systematic observations of judges in their courtrooms can clarify
expectations. That potential is unrealized for the most part
because of the low quality of most existing surveys and the
untested status of the observational protocols.88 Judicial performance ratings can be affected by the gender89 and race of
the judge and of the observer(s), particularly with respect to
different interpretations of the judge’s demeanor in the courtroom.90 This may especially be the case in relation to emotions, as the expected experience and display of emotion are
deeply gendered and raced.91 As a result, judicial performance evaluations might reflect implicit gender and
racial/ethnic bias. Research into emotion and judicial performance can potentially improve programs developed to evaluate judicial performance.
Fifth, there are also important positive links between emotion and judicial performance. The emotional state of a decision maker can influence or mediate the perception of fairness
or its absence in the courtroom on the part of the decision
recipient. Research shows that “people’s emotional state at the
time of making procedural justice judgements can determine
whether or not they perceive an encounter with an authority to
be procedurally fair or not.”92 Therefore, a judge’s appropriate
display and regulation of emotions may underpin the role procedural fairness plays in satisfaction with general court proceedings and in the success of new court forums like adult
drug courts in reducing recidivism and increasing compliance
with court orders.93
Understanding links between emotion and procedural fairness offers judicial performance programs criteria that are

See CHARLES GEYH ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (5th ed. 2013).
See Elek, Rottman & Cutler, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Gill, Lazos & Waters, supra note 37.
See Tomsich & Guy, supra note 53.
See, e.g., Adia Harvey Wingfield, Are Some Emotions Marked “Whites
Only”? Racialized Feeling Rules in Professional Workplaces, 57 SOC.
PROBLEMS 251 (2010).
92. Flyvbjerg, supra note 82, at 212; see also Kristina Murphy & Tom
Tyler, Procedural Justice and Compliance Behaviour: The Mediating
Role of Emotions, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 652 (2008).
93. See ROSSMAN ET AL., THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2011), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/MADCE_ES.pdf; Maroney &
Gross, supra note 1.

88.
89.
90.
91.

potentially better related to judicial performance in terms of
perceived fairness, compliance and cooperation with court
orders, and public satisfaction with and trust in the judiciary.94
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Judicial Wisdom:

An Introductory Empirical Account
Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Daria A. Bakina

F

or millennia, the notion of “wisdom” has been the
purview of philosophers or religious scholars. Philosophers literally loved and sought wisdom; biblical scholars
lionized King Solomon, wisest man of all.1 More recently, however, psychologists have begun to investigate the concept of
wisdom empirically. Beginning in the mid-1970s and proceeding apace,2 social scientists have studied wisdom from a variety of perspectives, falling under two headings of implicit and
explicit theories.3
IMPLICIT THEORIES OF WISDOM

At least three different approaches have been taken to the
development of implicit theories of wisdom. One thread of
research, probably the most common, uses a three-step factoranalysis approach: one sample of participants is asked to generate a list of traits or characteristics of wisdom generally or of
a wise person. Another sample rates that list of traits on, for
example, how typical each is of wisdom or of a wise person,
and the resulting ratings are then factor analyzed to identify
and articulate the underlying dimensions.4
Such studies generally converge on a small set of qualities,
dimensions, or clusters that are seen to represent aspects of wisdom or the wise person.5 Almost all identify a strong cognitive
component to wisdom—intelligence, reasoning ability, knowledge, experience, or problem solving. Over and above this intelligence, however, participants typically identify some sort of
exceptional insight as a hallmark of wisdom. Most also identify
a reflective component—introspection, intuition, ability to
learn from mistakes, even temperament (with some of these
qualities overlapping with the “exceptional insight” element). A
fourth trait, which all these studies identify, is affective, dealing
with interpersonal relations and a concern for others. Finally, at
least two studies identify some real-world problem-solving abil-

Footnotes
1. G. BRUGMAN, WISDOM: SOURCE OF NARRATIVE COHERENCE AND
EUDAIMONIA 78-82 (2000).
2. Monika Ardelt, Foreword to A HANDBOOK OF WISDOM: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, at xi (Robert J. Sternberg & Jennifer Jordan
eds., 2005).
3. Susan Bluck & Judith Glück, From the Inside Out: People’s Implicit
Theories of Wisdom, in A HANDBOOK OF WISDOM: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 84, 86 (2005).
4. Bluck & Glück, supra note 3, at 95; Ursula M. Staudinger, A Psychology of Wisdom: History and Recent Developments, 5 RES. HUM.
DEV. 107, 109 (2008).
5. Bluck & Glück, supra note 3, at 95.
6. STEPHEN G. HOLLIDAY & MICHAEL J. CHANDLER, WISDOM: EXPLORATIONS IN ADULT COMPETENCE 31 (1986); Robert J. Sternberg,
Implicit Theories of Intelligence, Creativity, and Wisdom, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 607, 613 (1985).
7. Paul B. Baltes et al., People Nominated as Wise: A Comparative
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ity—having good judgment, being able to apply it in real life,
giving good advice.6 This last is closely connected to Aristotle’s
concept of phronesis, discussed briefly below.
A second implicit-theory approach asks participants to nominate wise people, typically but not necessarily those known to
the participant, and then studies traits of the nominee or asks
the nominee to engage in some sort of wisdom-related activity
so that wise features can be identified.7 A third, less common,
approach experimentally manipulates aspects of wisdom or of
wise people to tap participants’ intuitions. For instance, Francis
Hira and Patricia Faulkender showed subjects videotapes of
individuals speaking about wisdom-related life problems, varying the age and gender of the speaker but not the content of the
presentation.8 Participants in that study rated older men and
younger women as more wise, implicating, perhaps, cultural
stereotypes about the wise person rather than a particular idea
of wisdom itself (although the authors attributed their findings
in part to nonverbal cues enacted by the speakers).
EXPLICIT THEORIES OF WISDOM

Two of the more prominent explicit psychological theories
are the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm (BWP) and Sternberg’s Balance Theory.9 Both emphasize elements of historical discussions of wisdom, and both emphasize a conception of wisdom
as roughly analogous to expert functioning in a domain.
The former, growing out of a life-span-development
approach that emphasizes successful aging, defines wisdom as
“expert knowledge in the fundamental pragmatics of life that
permits exceptional insight, judgment, and advice about complex and uncertain matters” and as “expertise in the conduct
and meaning of life.”10 The BWP defines wisdom in terms of a
broader construct rather than a personality characteristic.11
Wise individuals approximate the ideal of wisdom and serve as

8.

9.

10.

11.

Study of Wisdom-Related Knowledge, 10 PSYCHOL. & AGING 155,
157-59 (1995).
Francis J. Hira & Patricia J. Faulkender, Perceiving Wisdom: Do
Age and Gender Play a Part?, 44 INT’L J. AGING & HUM. DEV. 85, 90
(1997).
Paul B. Baltes & Ursula M. Staudinger, Wisdom. A Metaheuristic
(Pragmatic) to Orchestrate Mind and Virtue Toward Excellence, 55
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 122, 123-25 (2000); Paul B. Baltes et al., Wisdom and Successful Aging, 39 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION
123, 128-29 (1992); Robert J. Sternberg, A Balance Theory of Wisdom, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 347, 349-50 (1998).
Baltes & Staudinger, supra note 9, at 124; M. Pasupathi et al.,
Seeds of Wisdom: Adolescents’ Knowledge and Judgment About Difficult Life Problems, 37 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 351, 351 (2001).
See Monika Ardelt, Wisdom as Expert Knowledge System: A Critical
Review of a Contemporary Operationalization of an Ancient Concept, 47 HUM. DEV. 257 (2004), for an excellent overview and critique.

guideposts, and the role of psychological theory is to study
how people can be described as wise.12 The BWP designers are
more interested in the big-picture concept of wisdom as a “collectively anchored product”;13 others seem more interested in
identifying, among other things, the individual differences
associated with wisdom, wise people, wise decision processes,
and wise outcomes.14 Of course, there seems no a priori reason
not to study both.15
The second prominent explicit theory of wisdom is Sternberg’s Balance Theory, which involves a foundation of general
knowledge or academic intelligence, on which is rested tacit
knowledge or practical intelligence.16 First, wisdom inheres in
the interaction between a person and his situation. Sternberg’s
take on whether individuals can be wise is not clear from this
point; on the one hand, he seems to focus on wisdom as
process-focused. On the other hand, he often does refer to “wise
people,” “people who acquire wisdom,” and individual differences in both variables predicting wisdom and affecting the balancing process.17 Second, an individual’s decision making is not
wise or unwise (foolish) per se; rather, its “wisdom depends on
the fit of a wise solution to its context.” Third, as a result, the
same sort of balancing of decision-making processes may yield
a wise solution in one context but not another. Accordingly,
wisdom for Sternberg seems to inhere primarily in a decision’s
fit to the situation, rather than in an individual as a personal
characteristic (though this is not certain), in a decision-making
process, or in an outcome per se. As noted below, this question
of where to locate wisdom—as a trait, in a process, or in an outcome—is an important definitional issue but also an important
one for developing further research.18
PRACTICAL WISDOM (PHRONESIS)

In the discussion of judicial wisdom, phronesis or practical
wisdom is important to note; three aspects are particularly relevant here. First, Aristotle saw phronesis as an executive decision maker, a “master virtue” that tied together and managed
the others. But it is also more; it involves the skill to perceive
a situation the right way in the first place, recognizing the
need for action, and the skill to identify what features of a situation are most relevant and most deserving of further deliberation.19 Perhaps most important, though, Aristotle saw the
deliberation process, as does Sternberg, as having the “good”

12. Paul B. Baltes & Ute Kunzmann, The Two Faces of Wisdom: Wisdom as a General Theory of Knowledge and Judgment About Excellence in Mind and Virtue vs. Wisdom as Everyday Realization in People and Products, 47 HUM. DEV. 290, 292-93 (2004).
13. Baltes & Staudinger, supra note 9, at 130.
14. Ardelt, supra note 11, at 259-60.
15. See Monika Ardelt, Where Can Wisdom Be Found?, 47 HUM. DEV.
304, 306 (2004).
16. Sternberg, supra note 9, at 353.
17. Robert J. Sternberg, Words to the Wise About Wisdom? A Commentary on Ardelt's Critique of Baltes, 47 HUM. DEV. 286, 287 (2004).
18. James E. Birren & Cheryl M. Svensson, Wisdom in History, in A
HANDBOOK OF WISDOM: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 25 (Robert
J. Sternberg & Jennifer Jordan eds., 2005).
19. Blaine J. Fowers, Reason and Human Finitude: In Praise of Practical
Wisdom, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 415, 415-16 (2003); NANCY

as the ultimate objective; that is,
A wise judge . . .
phronesis involves deliberation
has certain
or reflection about valuable
20
goals.
dispositions
Second, Anthony Kronman
that interact
built on Aristotle’s notion of
appropriately
practical wisdom in his efforts to
recapture what he saw as the lost with the situation
ideal of a lawyer-statesman.21
at hand and
Kronman saw practical judgallow the judge
ment/practical wisdom/phroneto reason his or
sis at the heart of this ideal;
political and judicial skill
her way to the
depends on excellence in this
best outcome.
character trait. He too emphasized balance and the importance of combining internal decision-making skills—reflective
and perceptual elements. That is, practical wisdom was a skill
or “capacity” for joining those elements together in the appropriate way.22 The wisdom of a decision cannot be measured
solely by its final result but only—as with Sternberg—by
whether there is balance between the circumstances of the case
and the reasoning about those circumstances.23 A wise judge
need not have particular personal qualities that lead him or her
to be a wise judge; rather, he or she has certain dispositions
that interact appropriately with the situation at hand and allow
the judge to reason his or her way to the best outcome.24
Kronman makes two final points about practical judgment.
He states that people’s practical-judgment skill can be developed and believes that an ideal setting for developing the
means necessary for developing the skill is law school. The
critical thinking, understanding of particulars, sympathy,
imagination, and detachment necessary for thoroughly developing phronesis rest comfortably on the Socratic Method so
typical of legal education. Kronman, then, sets out two criteria
by which the wisdom of outcomes or decisions can be measured. The first is the degree of suitability or fit.25 The second
is the degree to which it “promote[s] political fraternity” by
accommodating differing viewpoints and maintaining the
coherence of a community with those different views.26
Perhaps the most direct application of phronesis to the judicial context is recent neo-Aristotelian work by Lawrence
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Jurisprudence, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 294-95 (2009).
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338-39 (2002).
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Solum. Quite simply, judicial wisdom is phronesis; it is practical
wisdom, as applied to the decisions a judge makes.27 The virtuous judge possesses multiple
judicial virtues—courage, impartiality, incorruptibility, intelligence, and others—but also possesses the ability to manage
them.28 The wise judge knows
what goals to pursue and how to
arrive at those goals.29 According
to Solum, phronesis is “the ability
to respond appropriately to the
particular situation,” to identify
what is morally relevant about a
particular situation, and to craft a just resolution. Indeed, for
Solum, this synthesis or balancing becomes an exercise of Aristotelian equity: the “tailoring of the law to the demands of the
particular situation.”30
The review here details the philosophical and legal writing
on practical wisdom, potentially or actually applied to the
judicial context. However, very little work has been conducted to translate those theories into empirical testing. One
of our goals here is to connect this line of legal and philosophical thinking to empirical work in psychology and lay the
groundwork for a fuller program of research synthesizing it
all. Thus, we turn briefly now to some of the existing empirical work on wisdom, recognizing a lack of empirical work on
judicial wisdom.

The virtuous
judge possesses
multiple judicial
virtues—courage,
impartiality,
incorruptibility,
intelligence, and
others—but also
possesses the
ability to
manage them.

PRIOR PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH

First, as mentioned, researchers have studied laypeople’s
implicit theories of wisdom.31 These studies have elicited
broad consensus as to the various components of wisdom—the
five elements identified above—and consensus that wisdom
involves some sort of integration, synthesis, or balance of those
capacities.32 There also seems to be broad agreement in
implicit conceptions of wisdom that wise people are usually

27. Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory
of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 192 (2003).
28. Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
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(1998).
30. Id. at 1754.
31. Bluck & Glück, supra note 3, at 89-90.
32. Ursula M. Staudinger & Judith Glück, Psychological Wisdom
Research: Commonalities and Differences in a Growing Field, 62
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 215, 218 (2011).
33. Lucinda Orwoll & Marion Perlmutter, The Study of Wise Persons:
Integrating a Personality Perspective, in WISDOM: ITS NATURE, ORIGIN, AND DEVELOPMENT 160, 170-71 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1990).
34. Carolyn M. Aldwin, Gender and Wisdom: A Brief Overview, 6 RES.
HUM. DEV. 1, 5-6 (2009).
35. Staudinger & Glück, supra note 32, at 224-26.
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old,33 but there is less agreement, perhaps surprisingly, that
men are more typically wise than are women.34
Second, more “top-down” work has focused on explicit theories, on conceptualizing and measuring the wisdom construct.
One approach has focused on “general wisdom,” with the paradigmatic examples being the Berlin approach and Sternberg’s
model. Another approach has focused more on “personal wisdom,” viewing it as a construct that reflects personal growth,
life experience, dealing with life challenges, or ego and identity
development.35 Researchers taking the latter approach have
sought to develop and validate self-report scales to measure
their notion of the wisdom construct. On the one hand, there is
often overlap in their theoretical constructs; on the other hand,
to the extent personal wisdom involves a substantial amount of
self-reflection, self-report may not be the best evaluative measure. Instead, promising efforts have been made to look at “performance-based” measures.36 For judicial-wisdom purposes,
general wisdom constructs seem more appropriate to pursue.
Third, researchers have studied the development of wisdom
and wisdom-related knowledge over the life span, again distinguishing between general and personal wisdom. Much of this
literature has looked to determining whether one type of wisdom might precede the other (apparently not; the development
of personal and general wisdom seems to be a dynamic process
where either can “take the lead”). Other literature has suggested a model that synthesizes personality correlates of both
types of wisdom (creativity, fluid and crystallized intelligence,
openness to experience, and others), experiential factors, and
sociocultural factors, all of which combine to facilitate the
development of wisdom.37
Perhaps surprisingly, neither type of wisdom is directly correlated with age; simply growing older is not sufficient to grow
wiser.38 Older individuals produce higher wisdom-related performance in response to dilemmas typical of older age;
younger individuals score higher on young-adult-type dilemmas.39 Nor is general wisdom-related performance correlated
with well-being,40 but negative life events might conduce to
increases in personal wisdom.41
Fourth, of importance for judicial-wisdom issues,
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researchers have examined the “plasticity” of wisdom, i.e., how
and whether it might be facilitated or taught. One useful
means of facilitating wisdom-related performance as measured
in the Berlin paradigm was to discuss the problem at hand with
a confidant; this was effective even when that confidant was
imagined.42 There is an interesting but underexplored connection here with Kronman’s suggestion that the Socratic Method
is useful for developing phronesis; perhaps even the imagined
Socratic dialogue can help individuals exhibit increased wisdom. More direct means, such as instructions to “try to give a
wise response,” have generally been found to be ineffective,43
perhaps suggesting some difficulty in introspecting about and
tapping into one’s own wisdom-related capabilities. Sternberg
is more adamant that wisdom, or at least wisdom skills, can be
taught: first, study classic works of literature and philosophy;
second, encourage dialogical thinking (perceiving ideas from
multiple points of view) and dialectical thinking (recognizing
that ideas evolve over time); third, encourage students to selfreflect and develop their own values; fourth, develop all these
modes of thinking with an eye to the common good; fifth
(again connected with earlier points), encourage a Socratic
teaching style; and sixth, have teachers act as role models for
wisdom. Sternberg and colleagues developed a curriculum for
teaching wisdom in middle schools, laying out an approach
and a series of evaluative measures; however, we have not seen
published follow-up to these efforts.44
Finally, this last point about the educability of wisdom has
been extended in applied fields, with researchers exploring the
relevance of these explicit theories of wisdom in education and
in leadership contexts—management, business, etc. Indeed,
Sternberg has developed a model of leadership that synthesizes
creativity, intelligence, and his Balance Theory of wisdom.45 An
appropriate balance will help leaders build on certain strengths
and balance the leader’s own capabilities as well as the capabilities of those being led, all to achieve a common good in the
relevant field. Other applications to leadership have emphasized situational factors, asking what situations conduce to
wise leadership.46 Still others emphasize that a wise leader will
know what situations call for what leadership style and act
appropriately.47 More specifically, wise decision making has
been studied in the contexts of medicine, nursing,48 business,49
clinical psychology,50 and politics,51 sometimes drawing
explicitly on the models sketched above.

Strangely, perhaps, despite
[J]udges were
application in these settings,
asked to generate
there is no published empirical work examining wisdom
characteristics of
in the applied setting of judg- wise judges. Then,
ing—of judicial wisdom—
despite the traditional image law students rated
of the judge as an archetype these characteristics
of wisdom. The only empirion whether they
cal work we have found
directly implicating judicial accurately reflected
judicial wisdom.
wisdom was an unpublished
doctoral dissertation, in
which the author administered an existing wisdom scale
(Ardelt’s [2003] 3D-WS) to Missouri judges.52 She also noted
potential implications for using this or other wisdom scales as
a tool in (s)electing judges. The studies presented here aim to
empirically establish scales of judicial wisdom drawing on the
work done by previous philosophers and psychology
researchers alike.
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Ph.D. dissertation, Capella University). The author also stated
that she had found no studies examining the wisdom of legal professionals.

STUDY 1

Methods
The first study was done in two parts, following the most
common approach in wisdom research. In the first part, judges
were asked to generate characteristics of wise judges. Then,
law students rated these characteristics on whether they accurately reflected judicial wisdom.
STUDY 1A
Participants
Forty federal magistrate judges (27 men and 13 women)
completed questionnaires during a voluntary session at two
judicial-education conferences in 2009. Twenty-three judges
participated in Session 1 (first conference) and seventeen in
Session 2 (second conference). Judges signed up for a session
on “Judicial Decision-Making,” during which they completed
a questionnaire and were debriefed. They then heard a general
presentation regarding theoretical and empirical research into
judicial decision making and engaged in discussion and a
question-and-answer session with the presenters. Thirty-four
participants self-identified as white, four self-identified as
black, and two did not provide an ethnic identification.
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Procedure
Half of the participants were
asked to list (among other things)
“characteristics of a wise judge.” To
assess whether their perceptions
involved not wisdom per se but
rather competence or skill, the
other half were asked to list “characteristics of an excellent
judge.” Participants were asked to provide a variety of demographic and professional information, including age, gender,
education, ethnicity, religious affiliation, political-party affiliation, political orientation, number of years in service as a judge,
and the federal circuit within which they sat. Judges identified
130 discrete features of a “wise judge” and 142 of an “excellent”
judge.

The analysis
yielded four
categories of
judicial wisdom.

STUDY 1B
Participants
Participants were 286 incoming first-year law students.
Procedure
Participants were given packets of surveys including the
130 discrete features of a wise judge identified by the judges in
Study 1A. Participants were asked to rate each one of the characteristics on a Likert scale (1, not at all, to 7, very), as to how
accurately the feature captures judicial wisdom.
Results
The first goal was to establish a reliable scale of characteristics of a wise judge. To do this, independent raters grouped the
130 features judges listed in Study 1A by dividing them into 32
categories, with all raters coming to an agreement. The dataanalytic strategy used in these analyses includes exploratory
and confirmatory factor analyses. Briefly, both types of analyses test the similarity between groups of items.53
Confirmatory factor analysis was then used to derive the
most representative feature for each of the 32 categories. Using
a confirmatory factor analysis tests whether the items in the

53. A factor analysis is a statistical strategy that finds relationships
between observed variables. In this case, the observed variables
are the characteristics of wise judges. Through correlations
among the observed variables, the factor analysis determines
commonalities among the items; those assessing the same construct will be grouped together. The formation of this group is
called a factor or unobserved variable. In this paper, we discuss
two kinds of factor analysis—exploratory and confirmatory factor
analysis. An exploratory factor analysis does not require a priori
hypotheses about how items would be grouped together or how
many factors will be derived. As such, this is often the first step
in determining how data are organized. The confirmatory factor
analysis makes use of a priori hypotheses (either derived from a
theoretical framework or a previous factor analysis). For our purposes, we used the factor structure obtained in Study 1B as the a
priori hypotheses about the structure of the data in Study 2.
54. To determine the items that are grouped together in this analysis,
one must examine the factor loading for each item, which indicates the strength of its association with the group as a whole.
Factor loadings can be thought of as a correlation, and the con-
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group are related based on a predetermined factor structure. In
the next set of analyses, we use the 32 representative characteristics to further classify the characteristics (32) into broader
themes of judicial wisdom.
After conducting an exploratory factor analysis, 19 of the
original 32 characteristics loaded onto four factors. This procedure reduces the 32 characteristics into categories of similar
themes. During this procedure, only items that are highly
related are retained (.4 factor loading).54 The exploratory factor analysis resulted in 19 characteristics of judicial wisdom
having a loading of .4 or greater. The remaining items did not
reach this threshold. Five of the items that could have been
confusing to participants were dropped from analyses. With
one such feature, for instance (“willingness to learn, to challenge and be challenged”), participants could have agreed with
the former part of the statement but not with the latter. Two
items were dropped due to cross loading55 among two or more
factors (e.g., “knowledge of the law”), and six items were
dropped due to poor loading (e.g., “balances interests of all
parties, including judge’s own interests”). These items may
have been too broad to be applied to the specific content of
what makes a wise judge.
The analysis yielded four categories of judicial wisdom. We
interpret the factors broadly as consistent with previous findings described in the implicit-theories literature. Factor 4
reflects the cognitive, decision-making skill typically identified.
Factor 3 is consistent with the reflective characteristic, and Factor 2 with the interpersonal or affective characteristic. We also
identified Factor 1, a quality reflecting wisdom-related skills
particular, if not unique, to judges. This may reflect the realworld problem-solving ability that some researchers have
found,56 or, more interestingly, something over and above conventional perspectives of wisdom that reflects judicial wisdom
specifically.57
STUDY 2

Method
The goal of the second study was to confirm the structure

ventional cutoff is .40. Therefore, those items that have a strong
correlation (>.40) with the factor itself are kept with that factor,
whereas ones with a weak correlation (<.40) are dropped from
that factor. Reasons for low factor loadings can include items
assessing a different construct from the factor or an item being
worded poorly.
55. Some variables or items may load or be grouped together with
multiple factors. This may be an indication of an item being too
broad, encompassing multiple constructs. There are many ways of
dealing with this both statistically and theoretically. For our purposes, we took a theoretical approach, analyzing each item separately to determine whether it was too broad to fit with the construct.
56. Holliday & Chandler, supra note 6, at 62; Sternberg, supra note 6,
at 613.
57. The full results and detailed statistical analyses can be found in
Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Daria A. Bakina, Judicial Wisdom: An
Empirical Account and Research Agenda (2008) (unpublished
article), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2129792.

of the wise-judge-characteristic scale and to establish the
structure of the excellent-judge scale.
Participants
Participants were a group of 247 incoming first-year law
students.
Materials
Wise Judge. Nineteen items were presented assessing characteristics of a wise judge (e.g., “A wise judge is a good listener.”). Items were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all
characteristic) to 7 (very much characteristic).
Excellent Judge. Items were taken from Study 1A, and three
independent raters grouped the original 142 features into 38
categories. The most representative item in each category was
then chosen, resulting in 38 items that were then rated on a
Likert scale from 1 (not at all characteristic) to 7 (very much
characteristic).
Results
A confirmatory factor analysis was performed on the
retained 19 items to find support for the four-factor structure
established in Study 1B. This specific data-analytic strategy
was chosen to replicate the pattern of abstract concepts (e.g.,
intelligence, interpersonal skill) through sets of related con-

crete characteristics. The hypothesized model for the factors of
judicial skill, people skill, open-mindedness to change, and
intelligence were tested as latent factors. In line with previously established work on implicit theories of wisdom, multiple aspects of wisdom were found in this data. Because the
same items were clustered together in Study 2 as in Study 1B,
the four-factor model was found to be the most appropriate for
understanding judicial wisdom.
Excellent Judge Exploratory Factor Analysis
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the data
obtained for excellent judges. There were initially 38 features
identified that resulted in five general categories of characteristics of an excellent judge. Seventeen items were dropped due
to poor loading58 or cross-loading. The explanation for poor
loading of these items could be that they were either confusing
to understand (e.g., “involves clients when necessary”), too
broad (e.g., “attends to detail”), or double-barreled (e.g.,
“respects precedents and the rule of law”). It is also possible
that the dropped items did not encompass qualities or characteristics unique to excellent judges (e.g., “thoughtful,” “practical”). These 17 items were dropped from the analyses. The
final result provided five general categories for characteristics
of an excellent judge. A confirmatory factor analysis was performed on a random subset of the data and supported the fivefactor solution.

WISE JUDGE, FACTOR ANALYSIS FINAL MODEL
FACTOR LOADINGS

Item
A wise judge is honest.
A wise judge is conscientious about following the law.
A wise judge is ethical.
A wise judge is diligent in studying evidence.
A wise judge is active in the community.
A wise judge is interested in the community.
A wise judge is caring.
A wise judge is spiritual.
A wise judge has political skill, in the sense of working well with people.
A wise judge is genuinely interested in people.
A wise judge is open-minded.
A wise judge is willing to admit mistakes.
A wise judge is always prepared.
A wise judge has empathy.
A wise judge is capable of making hard decisions.
A wise judge is rational.
A wise judge knows how to think.
A wise judge has superb intelligence.
A wise judge is intuitive.

1

2

3

4

0.680
0.505
0.718
0.622
0.567
0.445
0.507
0.620
0.487
0.573
0.620
0.411
0.428
0.562
0.400
0.517
0.505
0.598
0.697

Note: The table summarizes the characteristics of a wise judge in terms of how similar they are to each other within the groups. Each group is called a factor. In this data, we found
that there were four broad categories of judicial wisdom: judicial skill (Factor 1), people skill (Factor 2), open-mindedness to change (Factor 3), and intelligence (Factor 4). The factor loading is a correlation between the item and the factor, with a conventional cutoff of .40. Any item that has a factor loading of .40 or higher is retained.

58. Poor loading refers to items that fail to reach the conventional .40
cutoff. This is an indication that the item does not fit with the rest

of the items within the factor. Some items may not fit on any factors and are removed permanently from analyses.
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DISCUSSION

This paper summarizes some of the first empirical work to
address judicial wisdom, beginning with two studies trying to
identify lay conceptions of what makes a wise judge. Consistent with past research, respondents seem to conceive of judicial wisdom as similar to the wisdom construct more generally
but seem to include a quality particular to judges as well.
Our findings are useful in a number of contexts. First, they
help lay groundwork for a sustained program of research into
judicial wisdom. Second, they help us move toward developing
an explicit theory of judicial wisdom, one that is better, and
empirically, informed. The pattern of results obtained for characteristics of a wise judge replicate the theoretical approaches
to studying wisdom. The studies presented here apply wisdom
theories, both psychological and philosophical, to the specific
context of judicial wisdom. The four factors identified through
the data—judicial skill (Factor 1), people skill (Factor 2),
open-mindedness to change (Factor 3), and intelligence (Factor 4)—not only reflect how others perceive what a wise judge
is but also provide support for previously established theoretical models of wisdom. What is more, the characteristics of wise
judges were generated by judges themselves, providing greater
applicability and generalizability of the data.

Synthesizing both implicit and explicit theories helps us
derive an idea of the ideal wise person.59 Once there is some
broad consensus about this, we might be able to assess how
close to such an ideal particular people come. If so, then perhaps it is not unreasonable to use such constructs as evaluation
tools for prospective judges. Third, relatedly, developing robust
implicit theories of judicial wisdom helps researchers understand what lay participants in the legal process expect of
judges. Do they have a sense of judges as reflecting an archetypal wisdom, insightful and equitable and perhaps willing to
bend the rules and administer the spirit of the law rather than
the letter, or do they see the wise judge as bound by strictures
of the rule of law, or perhaps something in between? Combining such findings with existing research into public perceptions of the judiciary may be of use. For instance, Bybee and
others have documented that the public views the U.S.
Supreme Court justices as political actors and believe that
political factors influence court decisions more than they
ought.60 One of several questions to connect these lines of
findings is whether such perceptions correlate with a view of
judges as “wise” or with a particular view of what judicial wisdom is. Connecting with the point above, another question
might be to examine whether judges are seen as particularly

EXCELLENT JUDGE, EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
FACTOR LOADINGS

Items
An excellent judge is articulate.
An excellent judge is knowledgeable.
An excellent judge is experienced.
An excellent judge has excellent writing skills.
An excellent judge is highly intelligent.
An excellent judge is fair to all parties.
An excellent judge is neutral and unbiased.
An excellent judge listens to all sides.
An excellent judge is humble.
An excellent judge is kind and caring.
An excellent judge is sympathetic and compassionate.
An excellent judge has a sense of humor.
An excellent judge is ethical.
An excellent judge has integrity.
An excellent judge is honest.
An excellent judge is just.
An excellent judge treats all parties with respect.
An excellent judge has an ability to understand biases and prejudices.
An excellent judge exercises courtesy in judicial matters.
An excellent judge has the ability to make decisions.
An excellent judge is willing to learn and grow.

1

2

3

4

5

0.620
0.550
0.437
0.574
0.472
0.404
0.667
0.668
0.445
0.869
0.801
0.476
0.704
0.766
0.414
0.507
0.500
0.435
0.648
0.436
0.553

Note: This table summarizes the findings regarding characteristics of an excellent judge. Each characteristic is grouped with other similar characteristics forming five distinct factors: intelligence (Factor 1), fairness (Factor 2), compassion (Factor 3), ethics (Factor 4), and respect (Factor 5). Items assessing qualities of an excellent judge were analyzed separately from the wise-judge characteristics. The factor loading is a correlation between the item and the factor, with a conventional cutoff of .40. Any item that has a factor loading
of .40 or higher is retained.

59. Ardelt, supra note 2, at xiv.
60. Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!,
in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY
DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 306, 307 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed.,
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2011); John M. Scheb & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and
Public Opinion: Popular Expectations Regarding the Factors That
Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV. 181, 188-89
(2001).

wise when they act politically, or, perhaps, when they do not
follow the law strictly, or when they do uphold precedent
despite what might be seen as an “unjust” outcome.
Judicial excellence was a secondary focus of this paper, in
which we establish an initial model of how people think about
characteristics of excellent judges. Through examining judicial
wisdom and judicial excellence separately, we find that there
are different characteristics highlighted in each, with some
overlapping attributes. For example, interpersonal skill seems
to be important for both excellence and wisdom. However,
according to this data, to be considered an excellent judge, it is
expected that one is additionally ethical and respectful, even
more so than a wise judge.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

As noted above, our work begins a research program with
the ultimate, broader goal of pulling together threads of psychological research and philosophical and legal discussions of
judicial wisdom. With the empirical groundwork laid for
assessing both judicial wisdom and judicial excellence, future
research should refine the connection between these two
important qualities of judges. We have raised a number of
questions to be developed as the research progresses, some to
be addressed empirically, and others that will integrate those
empirical findings with our own (and previous) theoretical
work.

Jeremy Blumenthal, J.D., Ph.D., was a professor of law at Syracuse University. Professor Blumenthal passed away on December
19, 2014, before the completion of the current article that he
planned to submit to Court Review. His co-author continued their
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article to the Court Review audience. From the Syracuse Law
website: “Professor Blumenthal taught and wrote in the areas of
property law and law and the social sciences, incorporating
empirical research and data into legal issues. His work explored
decision-making by judges and juries, paternalism, the reasonable
woman standard, victim impact statements, behavioral law and
economics, emotions in the legal system, and lay perceptions of
crime. Recent publications focused on integrating empirical psychological research into property law; reviewing the field of law
and emotions; and speculating about the implications of treating
lawsuits as private property. He was also a co-editor of the treatise
Modern Scientific Evidence.”
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at the State University of New York at Oswego.
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So You’re Going to Be a Judge:
Ethical Issues for New Judges
Cynthia Gray

A

fter being elected or appointed to the bench, a budding
judge should immediately sit down and read the code
of judicial conduct for her jurisdiction.1 That review
will alert the future judge to the ethical principles that will
govern her time on the bench and begin a smooth, conflict-free
transition from advocate to impartial arbiter.
Outlining the advice judicial-ethics committees have given
about making that transition, this article highlights the provisions in the code of judicial conduct that will have the most
immediate implications for a nascent judge even before taking
the bench.2 It begins by listing the inquiries a soon-to-be judge
should make about charitable, business, and political activities
to evaluate what changes are necessary to conform to the judicial-ethics rules. It also considers whether a new judge may
accept gifts, including receptions, that are offered to mark the
new position. Finally, the article discusses winding up a law
practice, including duties to clients and payments for prior
legal work.3
OFF THE BENCH

Rule 1.2 provides: “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” (emphasis added).
Thus, the code of judicial conduct applies to all of a judge’s
activities, both judicial and personal and both on and off the
bench. In general, as described by Rule 3.1, a judge must not
participate in extrajudicial activities that will interfere with the
proper performance of judicial duties, lead to frequent disqualification, or appear to a reasonable person to undermine
the judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.
COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

After election or appointment, a nascent judge may be surprised to learn that some civic and charitable activities that
were an asset while a candidate may be prohibited after taking
judicial office. Even laudable community activities may bias a

Footnotes
1. The ethical standards for judges are established by the code of
judicial conduct adopted in each jurisdiction. The basis for the
state and federal codes is the Model Code of Judicial Conduct—
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1972 and revised in
1990 and 2007—although jurisdictions modify the model before
adopting it. Unless otherwise indicated, references to rules in this
article are to the 2007 model code.
2. Over 40 states and the United States Judicial Conference have
judicial-ethics advisory committees to which judges can submit
inquiries regarding the propriety of contemplated future action.
There are links to the websites of the committees at
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/Ethics/StateLinks.aspx?cat=Ethics%20Advisory%20Committees.

80 Court Review - Volume 52

judge in favor of particular parties, causes, or issues, encourage individuals to curry the judge’s favor, pressure others to
comply with the judge’s requests, or exploit the judicial office
for the benefit of private organizations—or at least create the
appearance of doing so. There is no exception in the model
code that allows a new judge to continue prohibited involvement in civic and charitable activities after taking the bench.
See Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-10 (a new judge may not
serve the rest of her term on the parks and tourism commission); Florida Advisory Opinion 2006-28 (a newly elected judge
should resign before taking office from any organizations in
which his participation is inappropriate); Texas Advisory Opinion 188 (1996) (a new judge may not attend the two meetings
remaining in her term as a state representative on a national
governmental association). But see Canon 7C, Michigan Code of
Judicial Conduct (giving a newly elected judge until June 30th
and a newly appointed judge six months to resign from organizations and activities).
Therefore, in the interim between being chosen and taking
the bench, a new judge should ask the following questions and
take any steps necessary to be in compliance with the new
standards when she takes office:
• Am I a member of a governmental commission that does
not concern the law, the legal system, or the administration
of justice (Rule 3.4)?
• Am I a member of an organization that practices invidious
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation (Rule
3.6A)?
• Am I an officer of an organization or entity that is engaged
in proceedings that would ordinarily come before me (Rule
3.7A(6)(a))?
• Am I an officer of an organization or entity that will frequently be engaged in adversary proceedings in the court
on which I serve or in any court subject to the appellate
jurisdiction of my court (Rule 3.7A(6)(b))?

3. The application of the code of judicial conduct requires a determination of the exact point at which a person becomes a judge,
which varies from state to state and may vary even within a state
depending on the selection process. In some states, a judge
becomes a judge on taking the oath of office. See, e.g., New York
Advisory Opinion 1998-92; Oklahoma Advisory Opinion 1999-2;
South Carolina Advisory Opinion 5-2006; Texas Advisory Opinion
293 (2007). Other states, however, have created different starting
points. See, e.g., Arizona Advisory Opinion 2000-7 (pursuant to
constitutional provision, an elected judge becomes a judge on
“the first Monday in January next succeeding their election,” and,
by statute, an appointed judge becomes a judge on the effective
date of the appointment,” that is, when the commission of office
is signed).

If a future judge has in the past participated in fundraising
for charitable organizations, she should review the code to see
if she can continue those activities and inform the organizations about any new restrictions to prevent inadvertent violations of the code. Under Rule 3.7A, a judge cannot:
• solicit charitable contributions except from members of the
judge’s family or judges over whom she does not exercise
supervisory or appellate authority;
• solicit memberships except in an organization that is concerned with the law, the legal system, or the administration
of justice; or
• be honored at, be featured on the program of, or permit her
title to be used in connection with a fundraising event
unless the event concerns the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice.
BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES

“Judges are generally permitted to engage in financial activities, including managing real estate and other investments for
themselves or for members of their families,” but participation
“is subject to the requirements of this Code.” Comment 3, Rule
3.11. Rule 3.11B, for example, will require a judge-select “to
resign as an officer, director, manager, general partner, advisor,
or employee of any business entity” unless the business is
“closely held by the judge or members of the judge’s family” or
“primarily engaged in investment of the financial resources of
the judge or members of the judge’s family.”
Further, a judge-select must examine her financial, business, or remunerative activities and withdraw from any that
will (Rule 3.11C):
• interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties;
• lead to frequent disqualification;
• involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing
business relationships with lawyers or other persons likely
to come before the court on which the judge serves; or
• violate other provisions of the code.
A judge must divest financial interests that violate the code “as
soon as practicable without serious financial detriment” (Comment 2, rule 3.11) but “in no event longer than one year”
(Application § VI).
Finally, to ensure compliance with the disqualification provisions in the code, a new judge must begin:
• to keep informed about her personal and fiduciary economic interests (Rule 2.11B);
• to make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of her spouse or domestic partner
and minor children residing in her household (Rule 2.11B);
and
• to conduct her business or financial affairs in a way that
avoids frequent disqualification (Rule 3.1B).
FIDUCIARY POSITIONS

To comply with Rule 3.8A, a new judge has to withdraw
from any “fiduciary position, such as executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian, attorney in fact, or other personal representative, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the
judge’s family . . . .” (“Member of the judge’s family” is defined
as “a spouse, domestic partner, child, grandchild, parent, grand-

parent, or other relative or person
A new judge
with whom the judge maintains a
close familial relationship.”) Even must resign from
if the fiduciary position is for a an inappropriate
member of the judge’s family, a fiduciary position
judge must withdraw:
“as soon
• if serving as a fiduciary will
interfere with the proper peras reasonably
formance of judicial duties
practicable, but
(Rule 3.8A);
• if the judge as fiduciary will in no event later
than [one year]
likely be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily
after becoming
come before her (Rule 3.8B);
a judge.”
• if the estate, trust, or ward is
or becomes involved in adversary proceedings in the court on which the judge serves or
one under its appellate jurisdiction (Rule 3.8B); or
• if serving as a fiduciary might require frequent disqualification (Comment 1, Rule 3.8).
A new judge must resign from an inappropriate fiduciary
position “as soon as reasonably practicable, but in no event
later than [one year] after becoming a judge.” Rule 3.8D. The
South Carolina committee advised that the rule does not authorize a new judge to remain a fiduciary for a year but only for the
time necessary to avoid serious adverse consequences to the
beneficiary, which can, in no event, be longer than one year.
South Carolina Advisory Opinion 21-2000. See Connecticut Emergency Staff Advisory Opinion 2014-21 (a nominee for judicial
office may be sworn into office while he is still serving as the
conservator of a person or estate in pending probate matters);
Massachusetts Advisory Opinion 2008-3 (a new judge should
promptly take steps to remove herself as a trustee of a trust that
is involved in litigation); New York Advisory Opinion 2010-169
(a new judge may complete the tasks necessary to terminate
conservatorships he held before taking the bench but should do
so expeditiously and, in any event, within a year); New York
Advisory Opinion 2010-47 (a newly appointed judge may submit
an application to be discharged from her duties as guardian for
an incapacitated person and prepare a final accounting in a
court proceeding); New York Advisory Opinion 2009-103 (a new
judge may complete fiduciary appointments made before the
effective date of his appointment and receive compensation but
should complete the work within one year, if possible); New
York Advisory Opinion 2002-37 (a new judge may not accept an
appointment to serve as a fiduciary for compensation but may
continue to serve in such capacity pursuant to an appointment
made before assuming the bench); New York Advisory Opinion
1995-39 (a recently elected judge who had been the conservator for an incompetent may, as a matter of necessity, continue to
perform essential services but must move promptly for the
appointment of a substitute); Pennsylvania Informal Advisory
Opinion 5/29/2012 (a new judge may not serve as executor of
wills that he prepared while practicing law and should instruct
his former law firm to inform the clients to replace him as fiduciary); West Virginia Advisory Opinion (March 21, 2011) (a new
judge may continue to serve as executor of an estate that will be
wrapped up in a couple of months).
Court Review - Volume 52 81

The restrictions
on political
activity . . . apply
immediately to
new judges.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

The restrictions on political
activity by judges vary considerably from state to state, may
vary within a state depending
on whether the judicial position
is an appointed one or an
elected one, and may even vary
from time to time depending on whether a judge is currently a
candidate for re-election. A new judge should carefully examine the specific provisions of her state’s code to see what rules
to follow.
Under Rule 4 of the model code, a judge shall not:
• act as a leader in, or hold an office in, a political organization (Rule 4.1A(1));
• make speeches on behalf of a political organization (Rule
4.1A(2));
• publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for any public office
(Rule 4.1A(3));
• solicit funds for, pay an assessment to, or make a contribution to a political organization or a candidate (Rule
4.1A(4));
• attend or purchase tickets for events sponsored by a political organization or a candidate (Rule 4.1A(5)); or
• become a candidate for a non-judicial elective office (Rule
4.5A).
The restrictions apply immediately to new judges. See Arizona Advisory Opinion 1993-4 (an elected tribal official may not
serve the balance of her term after appointment as a justice of
the peace); Illinois Advisory Opinion 1999-2 (a newly appointed
judge may not continue to serve as an elected member of a
public school board). Furthermore, some advisory opinions
suggest that an individual who has been elected or appointed
to a judgeship but not yet sworn into office is immediately
bound by the same restrictions on political activity that will
govern her conduct after taking office. South Carolina Advisory
Opinion 23-1994. See also Florida Advisory Opinion 2000-16 (a
judge-elect may not actively participate in a non-judicial campaign before being sworn into office); New York Advisory Opinion 1998-142 (a judge-elect who is vacating a seat in the local
legislature should not engage in political activities in support
of a candidate in the special election for the seat).
GIFTS AND RECEPTIONS FOR NEW JUDGES

A new judge will frequently be offered and can generally
accept gifts from former law partners, close friends, colleagues,
or bar associations to mark her investiture. A gift may necessitate the judge’s recusal from matters involving the donor, but,
in many instances, the donor is likely to be someone whose
appearance in a case would necessitate the judge’s recusal even
without the gift, at least for some period, or a group where
recusal may not be required for individual donors if each individual contribution is relatively small. U.S. Advisory Opinion 98
(2009).
Advisory committees have allowed a new judge to accept:
• a gavel or judicial robe from members of her family (New
York Advisory Opinion 2012-177);
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• a robe from a bar association to which the judge belongs
(Arkansas Advisory Opinion 2000-10);
• a clock from a bar association (U.S. Advisory Opinion 98
(2009));
• a gavel from the state’s attorney, who is a former employer
(Florida Advisory Opinion 1976-22);
• gift certificates from her former law firm (Pennsylvania
Informal Advisory Opinion 2/28/2012);
• a judicial robe from former law partners (U.S. Advisory
Opinion 98 (2009));
• a chair from former state judicial colleagues (U.S. Advisory
Opinion 98 (2009)); and
• a gavel and $500 from a former client (U.S. Advisory Opinion 98 (2009)).
The Connecticut advisory committee stated that a judge may
accept a gift from her former state government office at a dinner celebrating her appointment, gifts given at a gathering of
family and church members in honor of her appointment, or a
gift from an attorney who had been opposing counsel in cases
before her appointment and who is likely to appear before her
if the nature or value of the gift is not so great that a reasonable person would believe that the gift would undermine the
judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality. Connecticut
Informal Advisory Opinion 2013-10; Connecticut Informal Advisory Opinion 2013-9; Connecticut Advisory Opinion 2013-22. But
see Maryland Advisory Opinion 2003-1 (a master should not
accept a $50 gift certificate from an attorney to whom the master referred numerous cases when closing his practice if the
attorney might appear before the master); New Jersey Advisory
Opinion 4-2002 (a newly confirmed judge may not accept from
his former law firm a trip worth approximately $5,000).
Further, a new judge may allow her former law firm to
sponsor and pay the expenses for a reception following her
investiture. Florida Advisory Opinion 1999-3; Illinois Advisory
Opinion 2001-11; Minnesota Summary of Advisory Opinions, at
20 (1995); U.S. Advisory Opinion 98 (2009). See also Washington Advisory Opinion 1995-5 (a new judge should report the
expense of a reception hosted by her former firm if the value
exceeds the limit for disclosure). The Illinois committee cautioned that a judge may be feted at a post-investiture party
sponsored by her former law firm only if the party is not
intended to advance the interests or status of the firm. Illinois
Advisory Opinion 2001-11. The committee also warned the
judge to exercise “selected control” over the magnitude or
extravagance of the celebration and the number and nature of
those invited.
Other groups may also sponsor a reception for a new judge.
Florida Advisory Opinion 1999-3 (attorneys in a new judge’s
community); South Carolina Advisory Opinion 2003-16 (the
chamber of commerce, local businesses, and area attorneys);
U.S. Advisory Opinion 98 (2009) (a former corporate employer,
a business client, a colleague, or a bar association). However,
the advisory committee for federal judges warned that a new
judge may not accept either a gift or a reception from a political organization; a for-profit company that has no pre-existing
or long-standing relationship with the judge; or an organization that is publicly identified with controversial legal, social,
or political positions or that regularly engages in adversary

proceedings in the federal courts. U.S. Advisory Opinion 98
(2009). See New Jersey Advisory Opinion 3-2001 (a new judge
may not accept a check from the county bar association toward
the cost of a swearing-in reception).
PRACTICE IN THE INTERIM

A lawyer may continue to actively practice law during any
period after she is elected or appointed but before she takes
judicial office. As the Georgia committee explained, “it would
be unfair and unrealistic to require an active trial lawyer to
immediately withdraw as counsel in pending cases simply
because he or she has been elected to serve as a judge for a
term to begin some several months after the election.” Georgia
Advisory Opinion 217 (1996). Similarly, the Florida advisory
committee concluded that the risk of a judge-elect misusing
judicial prestige while practicing law was outweighed by “the
important consideration of allowing a lawyer to effectively and
expeditiously conclude those legal matters that have been
entrusted to the lawyer who has recently been elected to the
bench.” Florida Advisory Opinion 2000-39.
In the interim, a newly chosen judge may appear as trial
counsel (Georgia Advisory Opinion 217 (1996); Pennsylvania
Informal Advisory Opinion 7/2/04); practice before all courts,
including the court to which he has been chosen (Florida Advisory Opinion 1988-29); handle both criminal and civil cases
(Florida Advisory Opinion 1988-29); appear in jury and nonjury trials (Florida Advisory Opinion 1988-29); and be compensated according to a partnership or employment agreement
(Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-9).
Several committees have suggested that, to avoid future disqualification issues, prosecutors should consider changing
their duties when practicing after being chosen as a judge but
before taking office. For example, the Florida committee
approved a proposal by a circuit-judge-elect who was a chief
assistant state attorney to appear only in misdemeanor cases or
in felony cases in another geographic area of the circuit and to
immediately relinquish administrative or supervisory control
over felony attorneys who appear in the court in which she
will sit as a judge, although the committee stated those measures were not required. Florida Advisory Opinion 1984-21. See
also Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-5 (a deputy prosecuting
attorney who is running unopposed for a judicial seat may
continue to prosecute cases in the same district until she takes
office but should keep in mind future disqualification issues).
The Kentucky committee even suggested that a judge-elect
should resign as an assistant county attorney to minimize the
problems of disqualification. Kentucky Advisory Opinion JE-32
(1981).

4. A few states have provisions that create a limited exception to the
rule. See Mississippi Code, § 9-1-25 (allowing a chancellor or circuit judge or a judge of the court of appeals to practice in any
court for six months “so far as to enable them to bring to a conclusion cases actually pending when they were appointed or
elected in which such chancellor or judge was then employed”
and allowing a supreme court justice to appear “in the courts of
the United States in any case in which he was engaged when he
was appointed or elected judge); Compliance section, North Car-

WINDING UP A LAW
PRACTICE

Rule 3.10 prohibits a full-time
judge from practicing law. Therefore, attorneys must immediately
begin to wind up their legal practices after learning they will
become judges. For those in private practice, the winding up has
two facets: terminating the representation of clients and terminating the relationships and financial arrangements that constitute
the business of a legal practice.

After a judge
takes office,
there is no
exception to the
prohibition on
practicing law
that allows the
new judge
to complete
pending matters
for clients.

Representation of Clients
After a judge takes office, there is no exception to the prohibition on practicing law that allows the new judge to complete
pending matters for clients.4 Arizona Advisory Opinion 2000-7;
Oklahoma Advisory Opinion 1999-2. The New York committee
stated that, although a confirmed appointee may continue to
practice law until taking the oath of office, he should keep in
mind “the risk attendant upon the failure to do so within the
prescribed period.” New York Advisory Opinion 1998-92. When
the oath has been taken and filed, the committee emphasized,
“the appointee has become a judge and may no longer practice
law. At that point there can be no further ‘closing out’ to be
done that requires the practice of law.” See also South Carolina
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4G (the prohibition on practicing law “becomes effective immediately upon taking the oath of
office and applies to any case in the judge’s former practice that
was not completed when judicial duties were assumed”).
Thus, judicial-ethics committees have advised:
• A new judge may not appear in a federal district court in
another state to represent a defendant in a sentencing hearing shortly after he takes office. Texas Advisory Opinion 293
(2007).
• A new judge may not represent a client in a mediation even
if liability is not contested and the only remaining issue is
the amount necessary to settle the case. Texas Advisory
Opinion 293 (2007).
• A new judge may not present the oral argument before an
appellate court in a case he tried even if his client wants him
to and opposing counsel does not object. Florida Advisory
Opinion 1977-2.
• A new judge who briefed points raised in an appeal while
an attorney may not be listed as an author on the brief. New
York Advisory Opinion 2013-8.

olina Code of Judicial Conduct (“[I]t shall be permissible for a
newly installed judge to facilitate or assist in the transfer of his
prior duties as legal counsel but he may not be compensated
therefore”); Rule 3.10 and comment 2, Tennessee Code of Judicial
Conduct (“A newly elected or appointed judge can practice law
only in an effort to wind up his or her practice, ceasing to practice
as soon as reasonably possible and in no event longer than 180
days after assuming office”; “no new matters may be accepted”).
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Given the
strictness of the
rule against
judges practicing
law, “a newly
elected judge
should devote
substantial
attention to
winding up the
law practice . . . .”

• A new judge may not assist a
former client seeking satisfaction of a judgment
entered before he took the
bench. Florida Advisory
Opinion 2009-9.5

Of course, the practice of
law “is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected
with the law,” including “the
preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of legal advice to clients.” Florida Advisory Opinion 2005-19. Thus, those types of acts are also prohibited for a
new judge. See Florida Advisory Opinion 2006-1 (a recently
appointed judge may not sign a title-insurance policy after taking the bench even if the documents were recorded and the
policy took effect before the judge took office); Florida Advisory Opinion 1983-3 (a new judge may not complete a realestate transaction by attending the closing or complete the probating of two estates); New York Advisory Opinion 1989-38 (a
new judge may not complete unfinished legal services for an
estate even if no court appearances are necessary); West Virginia Advisory Opinion (December 19, 2012) (a new judge may
not prepare a legal document related to his prior employment).
There is no exception that would allow a new judge to perform “ministerial” acts for clients. The New York Court of
Appeals removed a judge for continuing to perform legal or
business services for clients, continuing to act as a fiduciary in
several estates, and maintaining a business and financial relationship with his former law firm, which had an active practice
before his court. In the Matter of Moynihan, 604 N.E.2d 136
(N.Y. 1992). The judge had contended that the tasks he performed—for example, filling out tax returns, banking activities,

5. See also In re Ramich, Determination (New York State Commission
on Judicial Conduct, December 27, 2002) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/
Determinations/R/Ramich.Thomas.E.2002.12.27.DET.pdf) (censure for, in addition to other misconduct, corresponding with
attorneys in connection with the pay-off of a debt owed to the successor in interest to a client for whom the judge, as an attorney,
had obtained a judgment, and signing a satisfaction of judgment
as an attorney for the judgment creditor); In re Slusher, Stipulation
and Agreement (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct, April 3, 1992) (http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/Case%20Mat
erial/1992/1205%20Stipulation.pdf) (public admonishment for
attempting to secure funds for a former client by communicating
with the attorney for the other party).
6. See also In re Jefferson, 753 So. 2d 181 (La. 2000) (removal of
judge who, in addition to other misconduct, participated in a case
as counsel for four years after becoming a judge, including writing a letter to opposing counsel seeking to close the file and signing a motion to dismiss that was filed during his second term of
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expediting stock transfers, and administering an estate—were
purely “ministerial” acts that did not conflict with his judicial
responsibilities. The Court held that, to the extent the acts were
ministerial, there was no justification for his failure to turn
them over to another attorney. The judge had also claimed that
his actions were necessary to wind up a busy practice with
long-standing responsibilities to clients. However, the Court
found that the two years the judge had continued to provide
services after assuming the bench was “an inexcusably long
period,” noting that the work involved matters that came before
the judge’s own court, albeit before different judges.
Rejecting a judge’s argument that he had interpreted the
code in good faith to allow him to finish his law practice by
performing clerical activities after he took office, the Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded that the work the judge had performed was more than ministerial or clerical and constituted
the active practice of law. Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission v. Thompson, 16 S.W.3d 212 (Ark. 2000). In one case,
the judge had met with clients in his chambers to discuss a settlement, accompanied the clients when they negotiated the settlement check, faxed a letter to co-counsel confirming their fee
arrangement, and sent co-counsel a cashier’s check with a letter, written on his judicial stationery, directing her to approve
the order of dismissal and giving her directions on closing the
case. In a second case, the judge had participated in several
depositions and exchanged legal correspondence and documents with opposing counsel and the court clerk regarding settlement.6
Duties to Clients
Given the strictness of the rule against judges practicing
law, “a newly elected judge should devote substantial attention
to winding up the law practice, with due regard for the rights
and expectations of existing clients.” Florida Advisory Opinion
2000-39. For example, before assuming judicial office, an
attorney must withdraw from client representation and cease
accepting new clients (New York Advisory Opinion 2005130(A)) and arrange for new counsel to handle any outstanding motions scheduled to be heard after she assumes judicial
office (New York Advisory Opinion 2004-137).

office); In re Ryman, 232 N.W.2d 178 (Mich. 1975) (removal for,
in addition to other misconduct, maintaining an office and furnishing legal services to former clients after assuming office);
Commission on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 876 So. 2d 324
(Miss. 2004) (public reprimand for filing six complaints and two
bankruptcy petitions in the six months after he became a judge);
In re Intemann, Determination (New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct, October 25, 1988) (http://www.cjc.ny.gov/
Determinations/I/Intemann.William.H.Jr.1988.10.25.DET.pdf)
(removal for, in addition to other misconduct, continuing to provide legal services for three estates); Disciplinary Counsel v. Bender, 11 N.E.3d 1168 (Ohio 2014) (two-year stayed suspension for
(1) during his transition from private practice to the bench,
neglecting a client’s personal-injury case and continuing to practice law after becoming a judge and (2) failing to timely withdraw
his earned fees from his client trust account, commingling personal and client funds).

Except for the addition of the deadline imposed by taking
office, the ethical responsibilities owed to clients when an attorney leaves the practice of law to become a judge are no different than those owed when an attorney ends representation for
any other reason, and an attorney should consult state resources
on that issue immediately after appointment or election. Rule
1.16(d) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides
that “[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s
interests . . . .” The rule specifically requires:
• giving reasonable notice to the client;
• allowing time for employment of other counsel;
• surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled; and
• refunding any advance payment of fees or expenses that has
not been earned or incurred.
Judicial-ethics committees have applied those rules to attorneys
newly chosen to become judges. See Arizona Advisory Opinion
2000-7; Illinois Advisory Opinion 1994-12; Michigan Advisory
Opinion J-2 (1989).
Thus, a budding judge should discuss with her clients the
options for obtaining counsel for pending matters, assist the
client in locating counsel with the required expertise, and discuss pending cases with the client or the client’s new attorney.
Alabama Advisory Opinion 13-920; Arizona Advisory Opinion
2000-7. See Kansas Advisory Opinion JE-11 (1984) (an attorney
who is becoming a judge may not suggest or recommend the
services of any particular lawyer). A file can be transferred to
another attorney only after full disclosure to the client and the
client’s consent, not only to the transfer but to any fee arrangement between the transferor and transferee attorneys. Michigan
Advisory Opinion JI-89 (1994); New Mexico Advisory Opinion
2012-14; South Carolina Advisory Opinion 21-1998; Texas Advisory Opinion 293 (2007).
Before taking the bench, a judge-elect should make clear to
her clients that she can no longer represent them in any way
after being sworn in, including providing advice or consulting
about continuing cases and prior work. South Carolina Advisory
Opinion 21-1998. Further, any necessary “discussion of pending
cases with new counsel that would constitute the practice of
law should take place during the process of closing the law
practice, not after the judge takes office.” Florida Advisory Opinion 2005-19. The New York committee suggested that “the safe
and ethical practice would be for the judge-elect to concentrate,
during the closing of the law practice, on providing subsequent
counsel with everything necessary to avoid the need for later
discussions.” New York Advisory Opinion 2000-77.
However, advisory opinions do distinguish between giving
legal advice, which is prohibited after taking the bench, and
providing factual information, which may be permitted. For
example, the Connecticut committee advised that a new judge
may answer a successor attorney’s questions about “factual matters not readily apparent from the file” or “the nature and location of documents and other historical information” as long as
she does not “answer questions involving legal advice or litigation strategy.” Connecticut Informal Advisory Opinion 2013-12.
See also Alabama Advisory Opinion 13-920.1; Nevada Advisory
Opinion JE13-001.

The exception has been
The issue of
applied to allow judges to file
post-bench
affidavits or unsworn statements or even testify about forconsultation
mer representation. For exam- arises frequently
ple, the Massachusetts committee advised that a judge may tes- in criminal cases
tify pursuant to a subpoena in a
given the
civil suit about estate-planning
sometimes
documents he prepared for
lengthy postclients after obtaining the forconviction relief
mer client’s waiver of the attorney-client privilege (or obtainproceedings.
ing legal advice from his own
counsel about whether the privilege should be asserted) and after ascertaining whether the
information may be obtained from another source. Massachusetts Advisory Opinion 2009-5. However, the committee
reminded the judge not to give an opinion, strategize with her
former client’s current counsel, or take steps to advance the
client’s cause. See also Connecticut Informal Opinion 2013-34;
New York Advisory Opinion 1996-128; New York Advisory Opinion 2007-32; New York Advisory Opinion 2004-67; New York
Advisory Opinion 1991-137. But see Florida Advisory Opinion
1979-12 (a judge may not, absent a subpoena, testify before a
state administrative agency regarding the history and purpose
of a statute she drafted while general counsel for a state
administrative agency); Kansas Advisory Opinion 161 (2008)
(a judge should not provide an affidavit about his recollection
of events related to a journal entry in a civil case in which he
represented the plaintiff).
The issue of post-bench consultation arises frequently in
criminal cases given the sometimes lengthy post-conviction
relief proceedings. For example, the Nevada advisory committee stated that a judge could provide the current prosecutor a
written verbatim transcription of her otherwise illegible notes
about a case prepared when she was prosecutor as long as she
did not discuss the notes, transcription, or any other matter or
otherwise help the current prosecutor prepare for a new sentencing hearing. Nevada Advisory Opinion JE1998-3. See also
Florida Advisory Opinion 2006-12; Illinois Advisory Opinion
1994-19; New York Advisory Opinion 2011-96; New York Advisory Opinion 1996-128; New York Advisory Opinion 1995-20;
Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion 4/20/2009.
Similar advice has been given to former defense counsel. For
example, the Massachusetts committee gave a judge permission
when subpoenaed to give factual testimony before the parole
board about a former client’s decision to forgo a plea offer made
by the prosecutor but advised the judge to ask counsel whether
her testimony was truly necessary or whether information
might be obtained from some other source. Massachusetts Advisory Opinion 2006-2. See also Massachusetts Advisory Opinion
2001-2; New York Advisory Opinion 2013-53; New York Advisory
Opinion 2007-153; New York Advisory Opinion 1995-116. But see
Florida Advisory Opinion 1999-4 (a judge may not execute an
affidavit explaining why he took certain steps while representing a former client and commenting on the former client’s good
character to be submitted to a prosecutor to resolve criminal
charges of workers’-compensation fraud).
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[T]he amount to
be paid to the
judge cannot be
based on work
performed or
profits earned
after the judge’s
departure from
the firm.

PAYMENTS AFTER TAKING
THE BENCH

Judicial-ethics committees have
advised that a judge may, after taking the bench, accept various
types of payments related to her
pre-bench legal practice. A revised
code of judicial conduct adopted
in 2015 in Maine expressly allows
that practice:
A judge, after leaving practice and becoming a judge,
may continue to receive fees
and payments entirely earned
while engaged in the practice of law before becoming a
judge, including fees for services rendered, payments from
structured settlements and judgments to be paid over
time, deferred compensation plans, retirement plans, payments to the judge for sale of his or her practice, payments to the judge for his or her equity upon leaving a
firm, and any other fees or payments entirely earned while
engaged in the practice of law before becoming a judge.

Rule 3.11E. The majority rule is that a judge is disqualified
from any matters involving a firm or attorney while the judge
is receiving payments from the firm or attorney. See Cynthia
Gray, “Disqualification Issues Faced by New Judges,” Judicial
Conduct Reporter (Fall 2010).
Addressing a common situation, the advisory committee for
federal judges stated that a new judge may receive payments
from her former firm after taking judicial office pursuant to an
agreement providing for payment of an agreed amount representing a departing partner’s interest in the firm. U.S. Advisory
Opinion 24 (2009). Other committees have approved receipt of
similar payments. See Alabama Advisory Opinion 1986-248 (a
judge may share law-partnership profits earned but not paid
before his assuming the bench for the approximately one year
it would take to complete all financial settlements); Alabama
Advisory Opinion 1989-351 (a judge’s former partner may execute a promissory note evidencing deferred compensation to
come due in almost two years); Arkansas Advisory Opinion
1996-9 (a new judge may accept a lump sum or installment
payments from the law firm he left); Connecticut Informal Advisory Opinion 2008-19 (a new judicial officer may accept a single payment for work done on a contingency-fee lawsuit); Connecticut Informal Advisory Opinion 2008-19A (a judge may
accept payment from a former law firm for a case initiated on
behalf of a client that the judge had brought to the firm as a
“rainmaker” in lieu of any payments for his interest in the
practice when the sole remaining case is settled approximately
four years later than the firm and judicial official had contemplated); Delaware Advisory Opinion 2004-2 (a new judge may
receive a percentage interest in receivables collected for services performed before his departure for a year, and, after a
year, a lump sum representing the judge’s interest in a presentvalue calculation of accounts receivable, anticipated proceeds
from contingent-fees cases, and payments under the firm’s
retirement plan); Florida Advisory Opinion 1976-1 (a new judge
may accept a fixed amount for his interest in his former law
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firm and the proportionate share of the fees earned before his
elevation to the bench); Florida Advisory Opinion 1974-4 (a
new judge may receive annual installment payments for his
interest in a firm computed on a predetermined formula pursuant to a standard contract for all shareholders); Florida Advisory Opinion 2003-2 (a new judge may receive periodic payments for his interest in his former firm or a note executed for
the balance); Georgia Advisory Opinion 12 (1977) (a new judge
may receive his pro rata share of fees earned but not collected
as of the time of his retirement from a firm); Louisiana Advisory
Opinion (July 8, 2010) (a new judge may receive installment
payments over 18 months from his former law firm representing approximately 10% of the fees the firm received from his
clients during his tenure with the firm); Maine Advisory Opinion 2005-2 (a new judge may over time be paid the amount of
money due from his former law partners); Massachusetts Advisory Opinion 2000-1 (a new judge’s former firm may pay him a
fixed amount at a reasonable rate of interest in installments
over 10 years); Minnesota Advisory Opinion 2014-1 (a lumpsum payment for a judge’s interest in his former law firm is
preferable, but, if immediate liquidation would cause serious
financial detriment, an installment sale is permissible);
Nebraska Advisory Opinion 2007-2 (the remaining shareholders
in a new judge’s former law firm may purchase his interest if he
holds the funds in a blind trust until a note of which he is a comaker is expected to be paid off); New York Advisory Opinion
2011-21 (a judge may receive a discretionary year-end bonus as
a former partner from his former firm based only on work he
performed before assuming the bench); Ohio Advisory Opinion
2007-2 (a new judge may receive retirement benefits from his
former law firm pursuant to an agreement only for a reasonable period to minimize the number of cases in which he will
be disqualified); Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion
10/29/2010 (a judge may receive installments for the agreedupon value of his interest in the law practice, including fees
earned before he took the oath of office; the firm may sign a
promissory note for the deferred payments); West Virginia
Advisory Opinion (January 16, 2001) (a new judge may receive
intermittent payments from his former law firm for an
extended period).
However, the amount to be paid to the judge cannot be
based on work performed or profits earned after the judge’s
departure from the firm. Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-9;
Nebraska Advisory Opinion 1989-1; U.S. Advisory Opinion 24
(2009). Some committees require that the amount to be paid
must be fixed before the judge takes office (Florida Advisory
Opinion 1974-4; Maine Advisory Opinion 2005-2; Minnesota
Advisory Opinion 2014-1), although others simply indicate the
amount should be set “if possible” (Nebraska Advisory Opinion
1989-1; U.S. Advisory Opinion 24 (2009)). The duration of the
installments should be short (Minnesota Advisory Opinion
2014-1; Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion 10/29/2010)
and “end at the earliest practicable date, ideally within a few
months” (Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-9), although some
committees have approved periods of 18 months (Louisiana
Advisory Opinion (July 8, 2010)), several years (U.S. Advisory
Opinion 24 (2009), and as long as 5 years (West Virginia Advisory Opinion (March 21, 2011)) or even 10 years (Massachusetts Advisory Opinion 2000-1).

For lawyers who leave a solo practice or small firm, judicialethics committees have approved a variety of arrangements
that include payments after the judge takes office. See Florida
Advisory Opinion 2013-1 (a lawyer who has been appointed as
a judge may sell his interest in a law practice and collect payments over time while sitting as a judge, but payments for
goodwill may not take into account fees earned in pending
matters transferred to the acquiring firm); Florida Advisory
Opinion 1996-26 (a lawyer recently elected to the bench may
transfer his practice to a purchasing attorney for a lump sum if
the practice is valued before the judge assumes the bench in an
arms-length transaction based on the best reasonable estimates
and may take a promissory note for a portion of the lump sum
as long as the future payments remain irrevocably tied to the
value of the practice at the time of the transfer); New York Advisory Opinion 2000-3 (a newly elected judge may receive compensation for the equity value of the judge’s share in a law partnership that is dissolving as a result of his election as determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles); Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion 12/7/2009 (a
judge-elect may sell his law practice in accordance with the
rules of professional conduct and receive payment after being
sworn in).
Fees
With certain conditions, after taking office, a judge may
receive payment of legal fees for prior work done as an attorney, including hourly fees, flat fees, and contingency fees, from
former clients, former partners, former firms, successor
lawyers, or successor firms. The Ohio committee explained:
Newly elected or appointed judges are not expected or
required to forego compensation for legal services they
provided before assuming judicial office. No rule in either
the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Rules of Professional
Conduct can be construed to require such forfeiture of
legal fees earned prior to taking the bench.
Ohio Advisory Opinion 2007-2. The rule applies to a former solo
practitioner, salaried associate of a firm, or a partner or shareholder who receives a percentage of the firm’s fees. Kentucky
Advisory Opinion JE-41 (1982). See also Alabama Advisory Opinion 2013-921; Alabama Advisory Opinion 1997-659; Alabama
Advisory Opinion 1981-114; Arkansas Advisory Opinion 1996-9;
Connecticut Informal Advisory Opinion 2008-19; Florida Advisory
Opinion 2009-9; Florida Advisory Opinion 1993-38; Florida Advisory Opinion 1986-7; Florida Advisory Opinion 1981-11; Georgia
Advisory Opinion 12 (1977); Illinois Advisory Opinion 1994-12;
Kansas Advisory Opinion JE-68 (1996); Kentucky Advisory Opinion JE-41 (1982); Maryland Advisory Opinion 2003-1; Maryland
Advisory Opinion Request 1974-6; Massachusetts Advisory Opinion 2008-2; Minnesota Advisory Opinion 2014-1; Missouri Advisory Opinion 62 (1981); New Mexico Advisory Opinion 2012-14;
New York Advisory Opinion 1996-91; Oklahoma Advisory Opinion 2005-2; Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion 2/11a/10;
South Carolina Advisory Opinion 21-1998; West Virginia Advisory
Opinion (December 18, 2000); West Virginia Advisory Opinion
(September 28, 1998).
The Ohio advisory committee noted:
Often the compensation due to the judge will be

straightforward, such as
when the legal services
were provided pursuant
to an hourly fee or flat fee
agreement. In hourly rate
matters, the judge would
be entitled to receive
the accounts receivable
reflecting the number of
hours billed by the judge
times the agreed upon
hourly rate. In flat fee
matters, the judge would
be entitled to receive the
accounts receivable for
the agreed upon flat fee.

The [Ohio]
committee advised:
“The most prudent
approach in a
contingent fee
matter . . . is for
the judge to accept
compensation, once
the contingency
occurs, based
upon quantum
meruit . . . .”

Ohio Advisory Opinion 2007-2. However, it continued, “sometimes, the compensation due to the judge is less clear, such as
in contingent fee matters that are not completed before the
judge assumes judicial office.”
If the contingent fee matter is completed before the judge
is sworn into office, the judge would be entitled to
receive the accounts receivable for the agreed upon contingent fee rate in the fee agreement. But if the contingent
fee matter is not completed before the judge is sworn into
office, there is no clarity as to how the judge is to be compensated. Is the judge entitled to compensation based
upon the agreed upon contingent fee rate or is the judge
entitled to compensation based on quantum meruit? Is
the judge entitled to compensation before the contingency occurs or must the contingency occur?
The committee advised:
The most prudent approach in a contingent fee matter
that is not completed before the judge takes the bench is
for the judge to accept compensation, once the contingency occurs, based upon quantum meruit for services
performed prior to assuming judicial office. In some circumstances, such as when the contingency fee matter was
nearly completed before taking judicial office, the quantum meruit compensation might equal the agreed upon
percentage rate in the contingency fee contract. In other
circumstances, such as when the contingency fee matter
was undertaken shortly prior to taking the bench and little work was performed by the judge on the matter, the
quantum meruit would most certainly not approach the
agreed upon contingent fee. [Citation omitted.]
There is no time limit on a judge’s ability to accept fees. See
Alabama Advisory Opinion 2013-921 (a judge may accept his
share of legal fees for work he performed before taking office
even nine years after becoming a judge); Florida Advisory Opinion 1997-9 (a judge may accept fees based upon work performed from 1988 until she became a judge in 1990 in a personal-injury case that did not settle until 1997); New York
Advisory Opinion 1995-12 (a judge may accept fees previously
earned that were not payable for one year or longer); Oklahoma
Advisory Opinion 2005-2 (a judge may accept payment of a fee
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owed by a former client four
years after going on the bench
and after he had formally forgiven all accounts receivable).
There are several conditions
imposed on a new judge’s
acceptance of fees:
• The amount, the percentage, or the method for calculating her share must be established before the judge takes
office.
The amount the judge receives must reasonably reflect only
the amount of work she did on the case before assuming the
bench.
The judge must not receive any part of a fee that was collected in matters that were not pending with the firm at the
time she left or that was generated by clients on matters that
arose afterwards.
The division of fees between the judge and the lawyer or
firm who completes the work should be reasonable and in
proportion.
The fee must not be clearly excessive.
The fees must be proper under the rules of professional
conduct.
The computation must be based on traditional standards.
The judge should consider whether the decision to accept
payment affects her disqualification from matters involving
the client, opposing parties, and the law firm or lawyer.
The fee arrangement must have been fully disclosed to the
client.

[A] new judge
may take steps to
collect fees if she
avoids abusing
the prestige of
office to do so.

•

•

•

•
•
•
•

•

Compare West Virginia Advisory Opinion (December 18, 2000)
(a fee arrangement must be in writing), with Alabama Advisory
Opinion 13-921 (if the arrangement is traditional or standard in
the legal profession and the judge’s former law firm, the lack of
a written agreement does not necessarily prevent the judge
from receiving the compensation due for work performed),
and Connecticut Information Advisory Opinion 2008-19A
(although a pre-existing verbal separation agreement is acceptable, written agreements are preferable).
Further, a new judge may take steps to collect fees if she
avoids abusing the prestige of office to do so. See Maryland
Advisory Opinion 2003-1 (if a newly appointed master was a
sole practitioner, the master may collect previously earned fees
from former clients); Minnesota Advisory Opinion 2014-1 (a former solo practitioner may continue to collect accounts receivable for a reasonable period following his appointment as a
judge); New York Advisory Opinion 1995-12 (to collect fees, a
new judge may forward bills to former clients for outstanding
balances due for services rendered before becoming a judge);
West Virginia Advisory Opinion (November 25, 2009) (a judge
may prepare fee petitions for legal work he performed before
taking office in a number of cases). Contra Kentucky Advisory
Opinion JE-32 (1981) (a judge must turn his accounts over to
another lawyer for collection).
Relationship to Firm
“Upon assuming judicial office, a judge is required to sever
all ties with the judge’s former firm.” Michigan Advisory Opinion
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JI-89 (1994). As an essential step in that process, a new judge
must ensure that her name is deleted from a former firm’s name.
The name change is required by both the code of judicial conduct and the rules of professional responsibility. Rule 1.3 of the
code prohibits a judge from abusing the prestige of office to
advance private interests. Rule 7.5(C) of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility states that the “name of a lawyer holding
a public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in
communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in
which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with
the firm.” See Kentucky Advisory Opinion JE-41 (1982) (a new
judge has a duty to see that his name is removed from a firm
name, and the firm has a “like duty”); Louisiana Advisory Opinion 155 (1999) (a judge may not permit his former law firm to
use his name in the firm name); Michigan Advisory Opinion JI89 (1994) (a judge may not allow his name to remain in the
name of his former law firm); New York Advisory Opinion 1989136 (before assuming judicial office, a judge must remove his
name from a firm’s masthead). See also Annual Report for Calendar Year 2015, Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct, at 9
(http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/137/2015%20CJC%20Annual
%20Report.pdf) (describing a private warning to a justice of the
peace to ensure that his former law firm’s website did not give
the appearance or leave the impression that he still practiced
law with the firm, including, but not limited to, removing his
name from the firm name). Cf. Massachusetts Advisory Opinion
2003-9 (a judge whose former firm has refused his requests to
remove his surname from the firm name may file a complaint
with the board of bar overseers but is not required to do so);
New York Advisory Opinion 2015-19 (a judge who asked his former law firm in writing to remove his name from the firm’s
signage, letterhead, and other materials need not take further
action).
Further, a new judge must ensure that her name is not used
in professional notices sent out by her former firm. Michigan
Advisory Opinion JI-89 (1994). See also Florida Advisory Opinion 2006-10 (a new judge may not allow his former firm to
make a congratulatory announcement about his recent
appointment in the Florida Bar News or a letter to the firm’s
clients); Florida Advisory Opinion 1994-45 (a new judge may
not assent to the publication of a congratulatory announcement by the judge’s former law firm or the firm’s mailing of a
congratulatory announcement to its clients); Massachusetts
Advisory Opinion 1990-1 (a judge must notify members of his
former law firm that he objects to the use of his name and title
in a brochure the firm is preparing for distribution to clients
and prospective clients).
Whether a judge may maintain retirement funds in a former firm’s plan at least for a short period depends on whether
that arrangement would require frequent disqualification and
whether there is an alternative that will not result in a substantial loss to the new judge. For example, the Connecticut
committee advised that a judge may leave accumulated funds
in a retirement plan set up by her former law firm for a reasonable time but in no event longer than one year after taking
the oath of office and should not hear any cases in which her
former firm is involved. Connecticut Informal Advisory 201513. If she creates a self-directed sub-account for which she
directs all investments and pays all fees and into which the

firm makes no further contributions, the committee advised,
the judge may maintain the account for longer than a year but
must disclose to counsel and to parties her participation in the
firm’s plan when members of the former law firm appear. See
also Alabama Advisory Opinion 91-417 (a judge may leave
accumulated funds in the retirement plan set up by his old law
firm if he sets up a sub-account for which he pays the management fee and into which the firm makes no further contributions on his behalf); Delaware Advisory Opinion 2004-2 (if
the terms of a former firm’s retirement plan permit a new
judge to withdraw assets, he should do so; if the terms do not
permit withdrawal, the issues that could arise out of a judge’s
continued participation in a former firm’s retirement plan will
depend on the nature and terms of the plan); Minnesota Summary of Advisory Opinions, at 20 (2001) (unless the account
can be transferred to another plan without substantial loss, a
recently appointed judge may maintain a pension and profitsharing account with his former law firm for a reasonable
period not to exceed three years); Pennsylvania Informal Advisory Opinion 10/29/2010 (a new judge may not keep his retirement account at his former law firm if lawyers from the former firm will regularly appear before him, if investment decisions are no longer made by the trustee, but by members of
the former law firm, or if it is not possible for the judge to create a sub-account for which he pays the management fees and
into which the firm makes no further contributions; the judge
may maintain the account for a reasonable time to avoid serious financial detriment).
Several committees have advised that a new judge who was
a solo practitioner or part of a small firm that is breaking up
when she leaves may maintain the existence of the firm after
taking the bench solely to wind up its financial affairs. For
example, the Connecticut committee received an inquiry from
a judicial nominee who was the sole shareholder in a small
firm that would cease to practice law after the nominee was
confirmed because the other attorneys were joining other
firms. Connecticut Informal Advisory Opinion 2014-4. The committee advised that the former firm could remain in existence
and retain its name (that of the new judicial officer) on a bank
account solely for receiving payments of fees as long as the
firm was not held out to the public as being in existence, there
was a written agreement as to how the funds were to be distributed, clients were notified that the firm was dissolved but
that payments should continue, and payments were received
only for work done before the judge’s confirmation. See also
Massachusetts Advisory Opinion 2008-2; Minnesota Advisory
Opinion 2014-1; New York Advisory Opinion 2007-5; New York
Advisory Opinion 2005-130(A); South Carolina Advisory Opinion

13-1996; South Carolina Advisory Opinion 8-2003; West Virginia
Advisory Opinion (November 10, 2011).
While winding down, the firm can collect accounts receivable, send periodic bills to former clients, maintain an escrow
account, pay debts, submit corporate-income-tax returns, file
unemployment forms for employees, organize and store financial records, and retain client records. However, the firm
should be dissolved as soon as practicable (New York Advisory
Opinion 2007-5; New York Advisory Opinion 2005-130(A)) and
remain in existence only until all accounts receivable are collected or until the end of the year, whichever is earlier (South
Carolina Advisory Opinion 13-1996), or within a year after the
judge assumes office, even if some receivables are still outstanding (Minnesota Advisory Opinion 2014-1). But see Ohio
Advisory Opinion 1995-3 (law-firm partners and a newly
elected judge should not continue their law partnership even
for the sole purpose of collecting accounts receivable).7

Since October 1990, Cynthia Gray has been
director of the Center for Judicial Ethics, a
national clearinghouse for information about
judicial ethics and discipline that is part of the
National Center for State Courts. (The CJE was
part of the American Judicature Society before
that organization’s October 2014 dissolution.)
She summarizes recent cases and advisory
opinions, answers requests for information about judicial conduct,
writes a weekly blog (at www.ncscjudicialethicsblog.org), writes
and edits the Judicial Conduct Reporter, and organizes the biennial National College on Judicial Conduct and Ethics. She has
made numerous presentations at judicial-education programs and
written numerous articles and publications on judicial-ethics topics. A 1980 graduate of the Northwestern University School of
Law, Gray clerked for Judge Hubert L. Will of the United States
District Court of the Northern District of Illinois for two years and
was a litigation attorney in two private law firms for eight years.

7. Cf. Florida Advisory Opinion 2005-8 (after assuming the bench, a
new judge should close a trust account from his practice even
though it is only being used for the distribution of funds when
received, and future disbursements should be made through the
trust account of a third party); Florida Advisory Opinion 2006-1 (a
recently appointed judge is required to change the status of his
professional corporation or dissolve it before taking the bench
even though it will be required to file an income-tax return, issue
W-2 forms, and prepare other documents well after the date he

takes the bench; his former professional association’s operating
account may remain open but should reflect the status of the new
legal entity established before the judge takes the bench); Florida
Advisory Opinion 2006-31 (a new judge and his former law partner
may continue to maintain a partnership account solely to receive
fees due the partnership for work done before his election as long
as the partnership has been formally dissolved, the account is
closed within a reasonable time, and the two former partners perform no professional services).

CONCLUSION

Attorneys are accustomed to being governed by a code of
ethics, of course, but the rules in the code of judicial conduct
will be new, touch on every part of a new judge’s life, and, in
some respects, require a reversal of practices the attorney has
followed for years. Thus, an immediate, thorough review of the
code may prevent a very public stumble by a new judge and
begin the commitment to judicial independence, integrity, and
impartiality the judge will be eager to maintain throughout a
long career on the bench.
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ANNEXATION
Across
1 Bunny’s leader?
5 Act the jackass
9 Egypt’s Mubarak
14 Folklore fiend
15 Do darn near nothing
16 Marine menace of WWII
17 Inter ___
18 Borne burden
19 Word after print or broadcast
20 Start of a quotation by Laurence J. Peter
23 Call’s counterpart
24 Latte ingredient
25 Accepts, as responsibility
29 South of Spain?
30 Part 2 of the quotation
31 Mitch who wrote “Tuesdays
with Morrie”
34 Rap sheet abbr.
37 Mountain pool
38 Brings home the ___
39 Felipe of baseball
40 Popeye’s Olive
41 Proceeds circuitously
42 Part 3 of the quotation
43 Not feel so good
44 Contemptuous cry
46 ___ Best (Starbucks subsidiary)
51 “La ___” (Debussy work)
52 End of the quotation
56 Present one side of, as a case
to an appeals court
57 South American country
58 Go full ___ (proceed at maximum speed)

by Victor Fleming

60
61
62
63
64
65

Ignorance, in an adage
Before too long
Writer Bagnold
Tries to reach
Track tipper
Quitclaim trailer?

Down
1 Long fluffy scarf
2 Wrinkled citrus
3 Filled with gloom
4 Brad Pitt’s costar in “The Tree
of Life”
5 Inebriated
6 Telephoned
7 Clear sky hue
8 What nods may translate to
9 Dull as dishwater
10 ___ the law (did one’s civic
duty)
11 Some Dairy Queen orders
12 Items to be filed
13 Writer Calvino
21 Expel, as a leader
22 Printer maker
25 Former Yugoslav president
26 On vacation, perhaps
27 Actor Malden
28 Round bread of India
32 Calculator feature, initially
33 Juicy pear
34 Ski resort near Snowbird and
Park City
35 German statesman Helmut
36 “The Clan of the Cave Bear”
novelist Jean

38
39
41
42
43
45
46
47
48
49
50

Female of the ball
Imputed
“... counsel is leading the ___”
Article
When stars start to show in the
sky
___ to something (succeed)
Some hunks of meat
“Copperhead Road” singer Steve
Dickinson of “Police Woman”
Certain exile, for short
Courtroom employee

53
54
55
59

Short pants?
“And Then There Were ___”
Buffalo’s canal
Byrnes of “77 Sunset Strip”

Vic Fleming is a district judge in
Little Rock, Arkansas.
Answers are found on page 59.

AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION FUTURE CONFERENCES
2017 MIDYEAR MEETING

TORONTO, ONTARIO
Toronto Marriott Eaton Centre
September 25-30
$214 (Canadian) single/double
(should be under $200 US depending on exchange rate)

WASHINGTON, D.C. /
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
Hilton Arlington
April 27-30
$180 single/double

Courtesy of washington.org

2016 ANNUAL CONFERENCE

THE AJA ANNUAL CONFERENCE: THE BEST JUDICIAL EDUCATION AVAILABLE ANYWHERE
For more information, go to http://amjudges.org/conferences.
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The Resource Page
o
JUDICIAL ETHICS BLOGS

Judicial Ethics and Discipline Blog
http://ncscjudicialethicsblog.org
Legal Profession Blog: Judicial Ethics
and the Courts
http://goo.gl/EHuafd
Two blogs that are regularly updated
can be a good resource that keeps judges
thinking about the ethics rules we must
abide by. Since reasonable people sometimes differ in their conclusions about
the boundaries of ethics rules, it’s good to
follow more than one blog in this area,
and both of these are good ones.
One of them—the Judicial Ethics and
Discipline Blog—is maintained by Cynthia Gray, director of the Center for Judicial Ethics now housed at the National
Center for State Courts. Gray has been
tracking judicial-ethics issues since 1990,
and she keeps track of pretty much everything that happens—advisory opinions,
disciplinary cases, and rule amendments.
A recent posting covered the issues that
arise when a judge’s spouse or relative
supports a political candidate. You can
sign up at this blog to receive each update
by email.
The second blog—Judicial Ethics and
the Courts (really the judicial-ethics
entries from the larger Legal Profession
blog, found in full at goo.gl/9yUJMB)—is
regularly updated by Michael S. Frisch,
the ethics counsel at Georgetown University and an adjunct law professor at
Georgetown Law. He also covers recent
cases and advisory opinions. For example,
a recent posting talked about a North
Dakota advisory opinion regarding the use
of social media in an election campaign as
well as whether a sitting judge may wear a
judicial robe in campaign materials. Frisch
not only summarized the recent advisory
opinion (with a link) but also provided an
excerpt from a 1979 North Dakota
Supreme Court case that found no problem with a judge’s campaign use of a video
taken in judicial robes in a courtroom.
92 Court Review - Volume 52
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MORE ON JUDICIAL WISDOM

Heidi M. Levitt & Bridget R. Dunnavant,
Judicial Wisdom: The Process of Constructing Wise Decisions, 28 J. CONSTRUCTIVIST
PSYCHOL. 243 (2015).
Bridget R. Dunnavant & Heidi M. Levitt,
The Development of Wisdom in Judicial
Decision-Making, 43 HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGIST 1 (2015).
Psychology professors Heidi Levitt
and Bridget Dunnavant set up a study to
shed some light on the concept of judicial
wisdom. They published two articles
with their results—one getting at the definition of judicial wisdom and the other
looking at how it can be developed.
The researchers interviewed 11 judges
nominated more than once by others as
wise judges. These 11 judges were asked
about the behaviors and attitudes they
associated with wise legal decision making. They talked about what they
believed fostered wisdom, such as curiosity and seeing situations as nuanced
rather than black and white.
These judges typically valued styles of
courtroom management that emphasized
listening, giving respect to litigants,
explaining court procedures, and
expressing compassion for parties while
still upholding the law. They felt that it
was important to be engaged in each
case—not only giving their full attention
to the parties and the law but also recognizing and dealing with the emotions that
inevitably arise on the bench. Wise
judges developed strategies for dealing
with situations where their own values
conflicted with the law or where they felt
that the correct legal outcome was not
necessarily the fair one.
To better promote wisdom, these
judges suggested that law schools put
more emphasis on pretrial problem solving, interpersonal skills, emotional intelligence, and social justice. They also felt
that increasing the diversity of the judicial profession would be helpful.

Only abstracts of the articles are available on the web (go to goo.gl/NJpsif and
goo.gl/FnnlEr); the full articles are available for purchase. But you can get more
information from an audio interview with
Professor Levitt. It’s available at
proceduralfairnessblog.org.

A
ARTICLES OF INTEREST

Fred L. Cheesman II, Scott E. Graves,
Kathryn Holt, Tara L. Kunkel, Cynthia G.
Lee & Michelle T. White, Drug Court
Effectiveness and Efficiency: Findings for
Virginia, 34 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q.
143 (2016), available at
http://goo.gl/NrGgwu.
The Virginia state courts contracted
with the National Center for State Courts
to conduct a statewide outcome and costbenefit evaluation of Virginia’s adult drug
courts. The findings will be of interest to
many, including those in jurisdictions
that have—or might want to have—a
drug court.
The program’s overall finding was that
drug courts saved taxpayers about
$20,000 per participant when compared
with a business-as-usual alternative path
through the judicial system. The study
compared participants in Virginia drug
courts with similar Virginia defendants
who did not go through a drug-court program. The researchers concluded that
successful graduation from a drug court
led to a statistically significant reduction
in the expected number of offenses committed thereafter.
One notable contribution of this evaluation was a finding that taxpayer dollars
are saved on drug-court participants even
before they are admitted to the drug
court. At least in Virginia, these offenders
spend less time in pretrial confinement
(and supervision) than they would in the
business-as-usual alternative (usually
probation). In addition, the researchers
found support for the use of cognitivebehavioral treatment in drug courts.

